Mr. President,

Excellencies,

Distinguished guests,

Ladies and Gentlemen

The organizers of this year’s Forum have requested us to stay away – and I quote - from the “recitation of past accomplishments and contributions by donors” and to engage in serious policy dialogue around future strategic priorities. I am pleased to heed their call, not out of disregard for the remarkable achievements of the past three years but because the magnitude of the challenges to come does deserve our undivided attention; and also because of a concern that too strong an emphasis on past and current successes may bring with it a feeling of complacency – a very inappropriate frame of mind in which to approach the dialogue on the future of the Afghan peace process.
Certainly, there is every reason to believe that progress made last year in strengthening domestic security agencies will soon translate in enhance stability; yes there is every reason to hope that, if all goes well, the upcoming parliamentary election will further entrench democratic practices in Afghanistan’s political system. Yes, progress has been achieved on many other fronts. But we must remain keenly aware of the great fragility of these gains. A number of key tasks of post-conflict peace building have yet to be completed, among which the extension of genuine security across the country; demilitarization of local power structures; the full resettlement of refugees and IDPs; the rehabilitation of key social and economic infrastructure; the gradual eradication of the narcotics economy; and the establishment of minimally functional government institutions. In addition, a number of essential peace building tasks have hardly begun, including the settlement of land claims - a pervasive source of violence; the restoration of property rights, and more broadly that of the rule of law; the rebuilding of trust among those whose lives were shattered by the war; and the rebuilding of unity between the groups that have been involved in the conflict of the past decades.

In recent years, much has been said in international circles about the frequent failure of the world community, in dealing with conflicts, to address the gap between short-term post-conflict recovery and the longer-term development of state capacity to perform effectively and responsibly. Because of the thorough destruction to which Afghan institutions were subjected during the war and the destitution prevailing in much of the country, this gap is particularly daunting in Afghanistan. We must not, therefore, take progress for granted. Perhaps nowhere in the world today is the consolidation of peace so tightly dependent on sustained institutional and economic reconstruction. Let us be aware of this circumstance and let us remember that while the establishment in a few months’ time of fully representative political institutions will facilitate the process of state building and recovery, it will not be a substitute for it, particularly against the backdrop of the dismal social and economic indicators described in the recent Human Development Report.

It is in this context that we warmly welcome the government’s invitation to dialogue around strategic priorities beyond the political transition; and we can endorse the list of key themes proposed to the attention of the Forum. They very largely reflect the concerns that the international community itself has identified, ranging from the need for fiscal sustainability to an emphasis on regional cooperation; from the need to balance social spending and investing in economic infrastructure, to strengthening the protection of the human rights of ordinary Afghan women and men. Taken together, they outline a broad agenda on which an understanding between Afghanistan and the international community must be achieved as early as possible notwithstanding the complexity of the issues involved. Strategic consensus on security and the political transition was achieved fairly quickly at Bonn under pressure of the tragic events of the fall of 2001. In contrast, issues relating to the pace and scope of state reform, the most appropriate strategy for economic development, and the potential and constraints of regional cooperation will lend themselves to diverse views, and, as the organizers rightly pointed out, may raise more questions than answers and reveal differences of opinion that will not be settled right away. One more compelling reason to engage in this debate without further delay in order to reach as soon as possible the common vision that will guide our joint efforts for years to come.

As we do so, we should keep in mind the very positive lessons learned during the past three years, which we have every reason to want to bring to bear on the implementation of the upcoming Afghanistan Development Strategy. One feature is the very broad partnerships that have gelled around the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Government institutions, bilateral efforts, private sector, multilateral organizations, NGOs and community organizations such as the community development councils, military and civilian actors have been present working together in many of the most successful endeavours to date, including refugee return, voter registration and election, DDR, vaccination campaigns, de-mining, the back-to-school campaign, the National Solidarity Programme, the building of social and economic infrastructure, among others. Certainly, improvements will have to be made, coordination will have to be enhanced, roles will have to be further clarified and, in particular, corruption will have to be vigorously rooted out wherever it takes place, but the unprecedented level of inclusiveness achieved in the Afghan process must be preserved.

I would also like to make a strong case for another remarkable feature of the Bonn process, namely its demanding implementation timetable. It has not always been fully adhered to but, overall, the relentless pursuit of the Bonn deadlines has stimulated the transition; strengthened its credibility – nationally and internationally; discouraged its adversaries; and made a unique contribution to the overall momentum that characterizes the Afghan peace process today. As we reflect on the implementation of the Development Strategy, I would argue that every effort should be made to stiffen its backbone with timelines that will serve to discipline domestic and international efforts, pace popular expectations, and build public confidence in its success.

Finally, allow me to contribute to this debate with one last point: Each year since 2002, the completion of the various stages of the political transition – ELJ, CLJ, voter registration, presidential election, parliamentary elections – has been accompanied by a large and growing effort of nationwide civic education and mobilization in which tens, hundreds of thousands have participated. Popular involvement in the Afghan process has not been limited to national politics. The tangible impact of President Karzai ’s appeal to community leaders to combat narcotics at the December Jirga and the participatory approach followed by the National Solidarity Programme bear out countless other illustrations of the fact that Afghan communities want to be heard, want to be trusted, want to take charge. This aspiration to ownership is truly a unique asset for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, in contrast to many post-conflict situations marred by popular indifference or disaffection. As Government authorities and we in the international community reflect on the upcoming challenges of state building and development, let us make sure we factor in this deep-seated culture of participation and provide Afghan men and women with every opportunity to become a central actor in the renaissance of their nation.

Kabul, 04 April 2005

Copyright © United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)