In the long years that I have been involved in diplomacy, I have often been asked by people outside the field about what diplomats actually do. Many, of course, are convinced that all we really do is talk at meetings and mingle at receptions. This is not entirely wrong, but one might add, however, that the work of the diplomat is a 24 hour job, because a good diplomat must always be thinking of the potential problems and opportunities developing out of the political environment he or she is faced with. Good diplomacy will, we should hope, help avoid potential conflict before it comes to a head. And so the best work of good diplomats is often work we never have reason to hear about, or to thank them for. That is why diplomats say that theirs is a thankless job. Though diplomats are called upon to help resolve conflicts, the emergence of tensions and disputes or worse, the outbreak of violent conflict, is a clear signal of the failure of diplomacy in the first instance. And as we know from so many peacemaking and peacekeeping endeavours of the last decades, ending conflict and returning to peace and stability is an extremely difficult, complex and uncertain process that requires steadfast commitment from the parties to the conflict, and from the international community.

After 23 years of war, Afghanistan is in the midst of this endeavour and I have been asked today to discuss the future prospects for peace in Afghanistan. As these relate to the fundamental agreement underpinning the peace process, perhaps you will allow me first to look backward at Bonn, before turning to the challenges ahead.

With the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, an opportunity was opened for the country to start on the long road back to peace. The peace talks convened at Bonn in November 2001 were an attempt to take advantage of that opportunity, by capitalising on the new found commitment of the international community. Because it was a small and far-away country, because it had served its purpose in defeating the Soviet Union, Afghanistan was forgotten, with only the UN and NGOs left to provide support – mainly humanitarian – throughout the 90s. The country was thus allowed to become fertile ground for fundamentalism and terrorism. On the eleventh of September 2001, the world discovered, in a devastating manner, that peace and security on the other side of the globe could be threatened as a result of so neglecting such a small and far away country. The Bonn talks also manifested the deep yearning of most Afghans to return to peace, weary of the decades of conflict that had, in the end, brought nothing but suffering to all corners of the country. Building on this consensus, the Bonn Agreement defined a road map to peace, a process aimed at achieving progressively a more stable, legitimate government, with more justice, more development and more peace.

What kind of peace agreement was produced by the Bonn Conference? It is now commonly agreed that no two conflicts are alike and consequently, every peace process is specific to the circumstances of the particular conflict that peace process has been crafted to resolve. The Bonn Agreement is even more specific than most. First of all, of course, it had to accommodate the fact that, although fighting between military factions had come to an end in Afghanistan, the Taliban had not accepted defeat. It was simply not possible to have the Taliban present at Bonn: their stubborn intransigence in giving shelter to Al-Qaeda, and their fight alongside them, kept them away from the peace table. Without all of the parties to the conflict present, the Agreement was to a degree limited in that it could not accommodate at the outset the whole range of positions in the conflict. Indeed, some, not all, of the most influential elements which emerged from both the war on terror and the Bonn Conference are still doing their best to monopolize power. Those who remember the bitter years following the establishment of the Government of the Mujahedeen in 1992, know that similar attitudes led to the destruction of Kabul and then to the emergence and spectacular success of the Taliban movement. One year into the Bonn process, those who have not forgotten those lessons know that the chances for peace will only increase from the inclusion of a wider cross section of Afghan political leadership than was present at Bonn, or than is present in the process now. There are many people who were not present or represented in Bonn even though they are very representative of a variety of important constituencies. They should not be kept out of the process. There are also some who where associated with the Taliban government, not the more radical elements, who may be willing to associate themselves today with the peace process. The more political space one can give to Afghans wishing to join into the peace process, the fewer people will be left outside with an incentive to destroy it. I will come back to this point again a bit later.

Second, the Bonn Agreement did not definitively fix the political or military terms of the peace. A peace agreement worked out in such circumstances rarely does. The institutions established by Bonn put Afghans in the lead. They would then have to chart much of the course of the peace process, with international support. The Agreement sketched out the broad outlines of a process, allowing for successively more representative government to be built along the way.

The initial, interim power sharing arrangements of the first six months were to be revisited when elected delegates from across Afghanistan met in a Loya Jirga. It was that Loya Jirga in June of 2002 that mandated President Hamed Karzai to form the Transitional Administration that he now leads. The Civil Service and Judicial Reform Commissions were also empowered by Bonn to address fundamental institutional weaknesses left by years of war, while the Afghan Human Rights Commission is expected to propose solutions to the appalling human rights situation, and the Constitutional Commission to prepare a new constitution to be adopted by another Loya Jirga before the end of 2003. Today, just over a year into the process, the Government as well as these Commissions are in place, and pushing forward the Bonn process.

There are many encouraging signs. Over 1.5 million refugees and at least half a million internally displaced persons have returned home. Schools are functioning, albeit at a basic level, and at times, literally under a tree. Generous funds from the international community are made available. No major outbreak of war has occurred. But the process is by no mean assured. Peace remains precarious, and the challenges ahead are great. Thus far, Afghans have been patiently allowing the new government time to establish itself, patiently waiting for a “peace dividend” in the form of reconstruction and economic recovery and patiently suffering the lack of basic security under the daily control of local military commanders.

2003 will be a critical year, in which Afghanistan will face the real test of whether the peace process is fully entrenched, even as the patience of the people wears thin.

A number of parallel efforts must come together: The creation of a new Afghan army and police and the demobilisation of existing forces; Constitutional reform; the beginning of the preparations for elections, and the implementation of large scale reconstruction and local development projects. Success in each of these areas will also depend on significant progress being made towards national reconciliation. Afghans from all regions must trust that their needs and concerns are taken into account, and that they can participate in public life if they choose. At the same time, each of these efforts also has the potential to confront the current balance of power and uncover longstanding political tensions and differences in Afghanistan.

Security and the reform of the Army
If you ask an Afghan today what is the one thing they lack most, they will tell you it is security. The ISAF multinational force has done a great deal to bring stability to Kabul, and the United States – led coalition has helped ensure that large scale conflict has not erupted. But the average Afghan continues to live under the arbitrary and often extortionary control of local military commanders, and must still worry whether his land will be taken away, whether his family will be safe on the roads. It is worth remembering that many Afghans welcomed the rise of the Taliban because it promised, and largely delivered, an end to just such insecurity. More broadly, the existence of numerous security forces undermines the authority of the central government and narrows the political space needed for reform and participatory politics in Afghanistan.

As you know, the United Nations has advocated for the expansion of ISAF, our view being that a relatively small number of troops could have a positive impact on security beyond Kabul. Unfortunately the necessary support for this has not been forthcoming. However, there has been welcome support pledged to train and build a national army loyal to the government, and in time, this may help resolve the situation.

A decree signed by President Karzai on December 1st last year provides the basis for the new multi-ethnic Afghan National Army, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of all other forces, and the reform of the Ministry of Defence. The Afghan leadership and their international partners are now working hard to establish the institutional framework to implement the decree. The national Defence Commission, - which brings together concerned ministerial departments as well as all the major factional leaders – met some two weeks ago and established sub-commissions for disarmament, demobilisation and recruitment for the new army. There remains a great deal of uncertainty and suspicion amongst Afghan military leaders; and the international community will have to provide substantial resources, political and financial, to ensure that these commissions begin to dismantle the existing military structures and create the new Army.

Security in Afghanistan will determine, in large measure, the destiny of the peace process, but achieving it will require more than a new Army. Police must be trained to uphold civil law and order, the judiciary must be reformed, the widespread cultivation of poppy must be curtailed and drug trafficking must be combated. These are all interdependent parts of the same challenge, and the international community has designated lead actors for each sector to help coordinate efforts with Afghan counterparts and gather resources from donors. The United States is in the lead on the army building effort, Germany on the police, Japan and the United Nations on the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process, the United Kingdom on drugs control and Italy in the justice sector. We meet regularly in Kabul to coordinate efforts, but, as with all other aspects of the peace process, we seek to keep the Afghans in the lead in each sector, defining priorities and ensuring that the institutions established are sustainable.

Constitutional Reform
2003 will also be the year of constitutional reform. President Karzai has established a nine-member drafting committee, which has done good work in outlining the key issues which will have to be addressed and researching various constitutional options to deal with them. In the next phase, we expect the committee to be expanded to a wider, more representative Constitutional Commission. That Commission will then undertake consultations with Afghans across the country, this summer, to hear their views and concerns, in order to draft a constitution that better addresses the needs of the population. Afghans must feel a part of the constitutional process if they are to accept and, hopefully, respect and protect the new constitution. Following the public consultation and discussions with constitutional experts, the Constitutional Loya Jirga will be held, we hope, in October 2003.

Here too, the process will not be without risk. Constitutional debate will bring forth fundamental issues of state – federalism versus a unitary central government, the role of Islamic vs. secular law – along with issues that go to the core of what society Afghans want – the role of women, minority rights, and so on. These are all sovereign questions, or issues relating to culture, history, traditions, about which all countries and people are naturally protective. The constitutional process will need the assistance of the international community, both in terms of finances and in some cases, legal expertise. But we shall have to be careful to preserve the perception and the reality of an Afghan led and fully owned constitutional process.

Elections Preparation
This need to balance carefully Afghan ownership with the necessary foreign assistance is equally important when it comes to elections. The Bonn Agreement calls for elections by June 2004, and we are working towards that ambitious target. Ambitious, because as of today Afghanistan has no institutions capable of mounting an election, nor does it have an electoral register. Political groups differ, even, on the number of districts in the country. There is also the very sensitive issue of the respective strength of each ethnic group with, for example, the Pashtuns considering they represent well over half of the Afghan population whereas others claim that they are under 40%. The participants at Bonn – or at least many of them – thought that the issue of the ethnic composition of the country should be settled before the election through a UN sponsored census. But that census would take at least five years to complete.

An additional challenge inherent in the Bonn electoral timetable is that, if one awaits the outcome of the Constitutional Loya Jirga in order to hold elections based on the new constitution, there would not be enough time prepare for a June 2004 election. Therefore, President Karzai is considering the option of preparing the elections based on a specially drafted electoral law and political party law that would apply only to the 2004 elections. This will allow the massive tasks of voter education, registration, and preparing for the ballot to begin in good time. Afghanistan will need the international community’s help to achieve these tasks, but only the Afghan leadership will be able to craft the consensus required to produce this “once-off” electoral system along lines acceptable to the Cabinet as well as civil society and the emerging political forces. Without this consensus, the eventual results of the election risk being contested.

Reconstruction and Recovery
As you can see, the political process in Afghanistan is set to accelerate. But economic recovery will be a precondition for the success of the various political processes underway. For refugees to return to participate in the political processes, for demobilised soldiers to have new means of income, for opium farmers to agree to switch to alternative livelihoods, Afghanistan’s economy must be revived. At the same time, economic progress will help to legitimise and strengthen the new institutions of government, and build incentives for rural Afghanistan to link with the centre and remain with the peace process. Afghanistan will continue to depend on aid for some time, notwithstanding the government’s determination to become self-sufficient. Fortunately, at a recent conference in Oslo, donors reaffirmed their commitment to Afghanistan. Many donors pledged the same amount as they did in 2002, or more. This aid must now be used to generate employment and cash for work programmes, build agricultural productivity, invest in physical infrastructure - the needs are vast, after two decades of war. And Afghans have high expectations.

Indeed, it will be a challenge for the government to manage these expectations. Even the four and a half billion dollars of aid promised cannot begin to cover the full cost of recovery, and people are naturally unhappy that their lot is not improving fast enough. However, I believe that if the Government and the international community clearly explain what is and what is not to be expected, Afghans will understand, and will take up the challenge to do the rest. They are a people well known in the region as hard workers and clever entrepreneurs. What they ultimately need is a bit of assistance and enough peace to complete the recovery themselves.

Challenges Ahead
I have outlined some of the challenges which are ahead in 2003. If Afghanistan can manage to build a new army to the point it cannot be challenged by other local forces, if basic civil law and order can be maintained, if a consensus can be found to underpin a new constitution, if a representative government can be elected, and if Afghans can reclaim their economic dignity, then the peace process might be said to be irreversible. That is a lot of ifs.

And yet, that uncertainty is compounded by the fact that this is not an uncontested project. I mentioned at the outset that not all the spectrum of political, social and religious opinions were represented. I very much hope that President Karzai’s determination to open the political arena to those who feel they were not properly represented at Bonn, but who are willing to support the process, will succeed. Such efforts at national reconciliation will be important, given the political tensions that are bound to accompany the heavy agenda for 2003. At the same time, we know that some of those elements outside the Bonn process remain against it, and that threat must also be met. Small scale terrorist attacks have continued to occur in Afghanistan, if sporadically, and we know little of the ultimate intentions of the perpetrators. The continued presence of the international community, not least the United States, will be needed, to deter those who might still wish to challenge the Bonn process violently. Afghanistan’s neighbours can also play an important role in protecting the peace process from interference. Afghanistan’s intensive diplomatic efforts on this front reached a milestone on December 22 when it signed a pact of “Good Neighbourly Relations” with all its neighbours, promising mutual support and non-interference.

Just over one year into the life of the Bonn peace process for Afghanistan, it is probably too early to draw any definitive conclusions. However, a few lessons have already been learnt.

Afghanistan was the first major peace mission to be established after the publication of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. A conscious effort has been made to implement some of its recommendations. Thus, the Secretary-General and his senior staff have tried to keep the Security Council informed of the situation and strived, in the terms of the report, to “tell the Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear”.

In Kabul as well as in New York, we try to describe reality as we honestly see it and we are careful not to promise more than we can deliver. Yet, it has not always been possible to avoid unrealistic expectations and consequently disappointment, not only from Afghan actors but from international actors also.
A process such as the one Afghanistan is engaged in, cannot move from one success to another and cannot conform to any mathematical, pre-established formula. Setbacks, hesitations and false starts have to be accepted as part of the process. It is in fact quite remarkable that, until now, all the very tight timeframes have been respected: The Interim Administration was sworn in on 22nd December 2001, the Loya Jirga Commission was formed by 22nd January 2002, the Emergency Loya Jirga assembled by the 10th of June to allow for the present government to take over from the Interim Administration at exactly the appointed time, all the Commissions were also set up on time, including the Constitutional Drafting Commission and it is very much hoped that the Constitutional Loya Jirga will take place as required by Bonn, before the end of 2003. In fact, we expect it to be held as early as next October.

Of course, the Human Rights Commission is not in a position, yet, to address all the very serious abuses Afghan men and women continue to suffer from almost everywhere, let alone take on the equally serious abuses of the past.

Likewise, the Judicial Commission has barely started to take stock of the state of total breakdown the judicial sector find itself in after a quarter of a century of neglect and devastation. The concerns of the international community for the people of Afghanistan and the spontaneous wish of many to see Afghanistan and its people rapidly consolidate peace and build a working democracy are very welcome and commendable sentiments. The people of Afghanistan wish to see these sentiments translate into lasting commitment to encourage and support their efforts as they strive to achieve those very goals.

But neither the United Nations nor any other international actor, no matter how sincere, may substitute themselves for the Afghans themselves and solve the problems of Afghanistan for them. Nor is it possible to solve these problems just by throwing at them increasing numbers of foreign experts. We can even less simply wish away complex problems inherited from 25 years of conflict.

To put it very simply, there is no quick fix here. If however, the Afghan authorities and their international partners set for themselves realistic, achievable objectives, if we of the international community have the determination, the patience and the staying power to do what it takes to really help the Afghans themselves, if, at the same time, we have the humility to realise that we do not know better than the Afghans what is better for Afghanistan. Then, there is every reason to be optimistic that the international community shall effectively contribute to the stabilisation of the peace process, and the journey which started in Bonn on the 5th of December 2001 will be successfully completed.