It is a great pleasure to be with you this evening at Harvard University. I am deeply honoured to receive the Great Negotiator Award, and grateful for your patience this afternoon as we discussed past negotiations in which I have been involved.

I suspect that John Ruggie – a former colleague at the United Nations, still highly respected and admired and still remembered very fondly and severely missed – had something to do with my being given the Award this year. I am touched, flattered and grateful. Having spent time at the UN and having been at the centre of everything important there, John knows that whatever is achieved is seldom the work of a single person.

With regard to Afghanistan, we owe a great deal to Kofi Annan’s leadership, and to his patience and perseverance even at times when discouragement had led many – including myself – to give up.

Furthermore, whatever was achieved in Bonn and subsequently was very much a cooperative effort, involving many who laboured generously and selflessly, away from the limelight.

Three of these colleagues and friends are present with us tonight: Ahmad Fawzi, the Director of the UN Information Centre in London who, as my Spokesman during those highly charged, tense and challenging weeks before, during and after Bonn, did an outstanding job both with the media and during our own deliberations. I will never be able to thank him enough.

Fatemeh Ziai from the Executive Office of the Secretary General and Salman Ahmed from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations were my Special Assistants. Their contribution was absolutely invaluable. We could not have done half of what we did without them, and I shall remain forever in their debt. Salman was also my Special Assistant during the work of the Panel on UN Peace Operations.

I would also like to recognize my new Special Assistant David Haeri, who has foolishly agreed to leave a perfectly good job in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to join me in Kabul as of next week.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Through my past experiences, I have been a witness both to intense human suffering, and to some of the most vicious and distasteful characteristics of human nature.
I have encountered people who became the pawns of war – people for whom ideological, ethnic or religious differences held little importance until someone else moulded these into an unshakable part of their identity. And I have seen wars end with the issue of accountability postponed or left un-addressed, because to do otherwise would virtually have guaranteed a resumption of bloodshed.

These experiences have, at times, led me to question the very existence of justice -- or at least to accept that peace and justice do not always go hand in hand. When we witness conflict, and know that human beings have been harmed or have suffered, our natural impulse is to categorize individuals and their acts within hierarchies of good and evil, morality and immorality, victims and perpetrators, innocence and guilt.

But solving a problem means searching for solutions, and solutions often lie in the least savoury places and with the least savoury people. Helping people make peace is one thing. Indicting them for crimes is quite another. Fortunately, even those who provoke or prolong war can eventually tire of it, or grow weak, and these are the moments that the negotiator must seize.

One of the lessons I have drawn from my own experiences is that every “wrong” cannot be put “right”, no matter how much effort is applied or how many resources are thrown at the problem. And even when a wrong can be put right, this may not necessarily be achievable overnight. This should not serve as a justification for inaction, or for compromise on fundamental principles. Rather, it is a reminder that step-by-step solutions, though they may not offer immediate gratification, often stand a greater chance of leading to the results desired.

The United Nations has been involved in peacekeeping since the Organization’s early days. The Security Council established the first UN peacekeeping operation in June 1948, to supervise the truce in the first Arab-Israeli war. Six months later, it sent a Military Observer Group to monitor the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Over the next half-century, over fifty other peacekeeping operations were deployed throughout the world.

If the success of a peacekeeping operation is measured by how soon the United Nations’ blue helmets are able to depart, then the first two peacekeeping operations would have to be characterized as failures, for more than fifty years later, both conflicts are still very much alive and the UN’s peacekeeping operations remain in place.

But peace is rarely made because one party admits that it has wronged the other. Rather, it is usually the result of a standoff, or defeat. This is why most truces are, by definition, fragile, and why the United Nations has often found itself deploying peacekeeping troops in situations where it has turned out that there was no peace to keep.
Perhaps two of the most tragic failures of UN peacekeeping were the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the fall of Srebrenica in 1995. From these tragedies came the realization that something was terribly wrong with the state of UN peacekeeping. This led the Secretary-General to set up an independent panel in March 2000, to examine ways in which the effectiveness of UN peace operations could be improved.

The Panel, which I chaired, concluded that the powerful members of the international community had used certain United Nations peacekeeping operations as a means of being seen as “doing something” in the face of pubic outcry, even when the political will for forceful action was lacking, or consensus about the best course of action could not be achieved.

The report stated that, in some cases, the “right” response to a conflict was not to deploy a peacekeeping operation at all, because the conditions for success simply did not exist. In other cases, it meant deploying far better resourced and supported operations, taking into consideration the magnitude of the task and the risks involved.

The report appealed to Member States to stop asking the Organization to “do more with less”, but rather to “do less with more”, and called for more and better-equipped troops when a military presence was required. It also argued for more staff at Headquarters to backstop these operations, and enhanced political, financial and material support from Member States, in order to overcome obstacles presented when there were one or more recalcitrant parties on the ground.

The report described, in plain language, failings that had been known to Member States and the UN Secretariat for a long time, but had never been confronted in such stark and candid terms. Most important, the report’s recommendations were, to quote the Secretary General, “ambitious, yet realistic and concrete”. The response of both the Security Council and the General Assembly to the report was largely favourable and I hope the continuing debate will lead to a number of fairly substantial changes in the way in which peace operations are approached.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was the first peace operation to be established after the Panel’s report. As the negotiations in Bonn progressed, therefore, one of the questions in the back of everyone’s mind was what form the UN Mission would take.

The debate took place under unbearable pressure: the Secretary General and all those involved alongside him with Afghanistan had one thousand other things to do and everything was urgent.

The temptation simply to copy what had been done before with other missions was difficult to resist, but it was necessary to resist and was resisted … a little.

Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the concept adopted was less than perfect. Knowing what we know today, we would probably have established a significantly different mission.

One thing that would not have been different, however, is that security concerns would still have been at the top of our list of priorities.

It was clear that an international security force of some sort would be needed to supervise the ceasefire. It was my view that an armed UN peacekeeping force was not advisable. The process of obtaining, from UN Member States, a sufficient number of troops to constitute a military deterrent, and then to deploy those troops, would have taken months. And without a quick and credible security arrangement, it would have been impossible to implement a political settlement. With respect to Kabul, in particular, there was a real fear that inadequate security could propel the capital back into the violence and destruction that had prevailed after the fall of the Soviet-backed regime in 1992.

The other option was the deployment of a multinational force – that is, a “coalition of the willing” – mandated by the UN Security Council, but not composed of “blue helmets” under UN command.

This was the route that the parties in Bonn eventually opted for, and this force, which deployed in Kabul in January 2002 under British command, became known as the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF.

Other questions concerned the civilian component of the United Nations presence.
In two recent peacekeeping operations – Kosovo and East Timor – the United Nations had been given responsibility for “transitional administration” of a territory – in essence, serving as the government, with responsibilities ranging from basic civilian administrative functions and maintenance of civil law and order, to promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government.

The situation in Afghanistan, however, was completely different. First, it was a sovereign country, not a territory hoping to attain autonomy or independence. Moreover, the country had suffered no end of foreign invasions and occupations in its history, and there was little enthusiasm for inviting foreigners to come in and run the country.

Afghanistan had been destroyed and devastated following twenty-three years of brutal conflict, and would clearly require large-scale assistance from the international community for many years to come. But the object of the exercise was to help the newly established national government consolidate itself and rebuild its institutions.

To be sure, this government was bound to be weak and inexperienced, and there were doubts about whether it would be able to extend its authority beyond Kabul any time soon. But the international community no longer needed to fill the void that had existed earlier, in the absence of governmental institutions.

For any one who knew anything about Afghanistan, it was evident that Afghans would unanimously demand to pick up the pieces of their country on their own. Indeed, this was the message that came across from the parties sitting around the table in Bonn. And this was reflected in the Bonn Agreement, in which the United Nations was given the role of monitoring, advising and assisting with the implementation of the agreement.

As I have said on many other occasions, we have tried to be consistent with this philosophy in the UN Mission in Afghanistan, though I am sometimes told that this runs counter to the culture of the United Nations, and to that of most other international organizations and governments. The essence of our approach is to ensure, first and foremost, that the activities of the United Nations strengthen national capacities – not our own institutional capabilities; and, second, that we are responsive to the priorities articulated by the Afghans themselves – and not to our own agendas or priorities.

Tied to this is a simple principle, referred to as the “light expatriate footprint”, which has become one of the cornerstones of the UN Mission. Essentially, this requires that we strive to build Afghan capacities – not only in Kabul, but also in the regional, provincial and district administrations – so that Afghans can take over as many of the functions that international staff are now performing, as soon as possible.

Our goal, individually and collectively, should be to work ourselves out of a job as quickly as possible. The ultimate success for each and every one of us will be achieved the day we are no longer needed in Afghanistan. Experience has shown that the number of UN agencies flying their flags in a country is not proportionate to the overall success achieved. On the contrary, this often leads to duplication, confusion and waste.

What the light footprint requires is a recognition that the mere fact that the UN has carried out a certain activity in dozens of other countries, and has the funding to do so again, does not necessarily mean that this activity is needed or appropriate in Afghanistan. And even if it is, the United Nations may not necessarily be the best organization to rush in to implement it. Indeed, providing effective assistance requires not only an understanding of the local needs and context, but also a recognition of one’s own limitations.

Our colleagues in the field of mine action have managed to achieve a light footprint in Afghanistan, and we can all learn a great deal from their experience.
I believe that there are fewer than a dozen expatriates still working in demining in Afghanistan today, while the number of Afghans is approaching 7,000. The entire operation is ready to be handed over to the Afghan authorities the moment they are ready to assume the responsibility.

The United Nations, as a whole, does not yet have a truly light footprint in Afghanistan, and whether this proves achievable in the future remains to be seen.
But the very fact that the UN has set these objectives should progressively ease the way toward making peacebuilding and reconstruction in Afghanistan an Afghan-led process – something that the Afghans themselves are now demanding with growing insistence.
And if there is one lesson that years of experience in peacekeeping and peacebuilding has taught us, it is that a peace and reconstruction process stands a far better chance of success when it is nationally owned, rather than led by external actors.

So far, the peace process is on track. To be sure, it is a fragile peace, which must be handled with great care so that it does not unravel. But there are a few important factors that give rise to cautious optimism.

First, the people of Afghanistan are truly tired of fighting. After twenty-three years in which they experienced every form of bloodshed and repression, and witnessed every kind of loss and destruction, Afghans are finally getting a taste of peace, and most are determined to do everything in their power to avoid a relapse into war.

Second, while there are still many individuals and factions that seek power, and are perhaps ready to go to great lengths to achieve or hold on to it, no one has, so far, opted out of the peace process.

Third, the international community’s interest in Afghanistan has not waned, despite the fact that there are many other crises and deserving causes elsewhere in the world.

Nevertheless, numerous challenges require our urgent attention in the months ahead, lest they develop into obstacles to peace.

The single greatest concern is the issue of security, which continues to loom large in Afghanistan. It is a prerequisite to the implementation of the peace process, and will have a profound impact on the credibility of the Afghan Transitional Authority. Yet, security remains precarious in much of the country, and many Afghans still feel that they are at the mercy of local commanders or armed groups.

As far as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are concerned, it is no clearer to us now than when we first arrived in Kabul nine months ago how many of their members remain in Afghanistan, and how much of a threat they really pose to the country’s stability. Until and unless we have evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these groups still do pose a threat.

The recent assassination attempt on President Karzai, the deadly explosion in Kabul earlier in September, and many -- far too many -- other very worrying incidents, attest to the great uncertainty that persists around the issue of security.

Ultimately, the real key to the restoration of security lies in the creation of a national army and a national police force, along with a strong demobilisation programme. In the meantime, however, an interim solution is needed to address the country’s security problems.

Despite the dramatic improvement in security in Kabul due to the presence of ISAF, however, key UN Member States have failed to support the Force’s expansion to other parts of the country, although the United Nations has repeatedly argued that the expansion of ISAF could be achieved with relatively few troops, at relatively little cost, and with little danger.

As for the humanitarian situation in the country, it remains precarious, at best, but the UN and its NGO implementing partners continue to face serious funding shortfalls.
This situation has been exacerbated by the fact that refugees are returning to Afghanistan in record numbers, but due to the lack of services in towns and villages, most are flocking to already overcrowded and overburdened urban centres. As winter approaches, a real crisis could emerge.

The pace of reconstruction and rehabilitation activities has also been far too slow, and has led to a budget deficit that risks shutting down vital government services.
More than a third of the funds that had been pledged to rebuild Afghanistan have not been delivered yet and most of the basic needs of the population are still not being met.

The expectations of the Afghan people are relatively modest, but even so, many are beginning to wonder if this peace will ever bring them any dividends. Unless employment opportunities increase, and there are visible signs of progress in key sectors such as education, healthcare, infrastructure and agriculture, tensions are bound to grow.

A number of other issues will take on increasing significance over the next six to twelve months. The Judicial and Human Rights Commissions set up under the Bonn Agreement are now slowly becoming operational, and a Constitutional Commission will be established shortly. All of these will be critical to helping to restore – progressively – accountability and the rule of law in Afghanistan.

Elections are scheduled to take place in less than two years – an extremely tight timeframe that will pose logistical and other difficulties.

To meet these challenges, the Transitional Authority must put in place strong measures to promote good governance, transparency, the rule of law, and the participation of women.

Clearly, the international community will have to provide significant assistance – both financial and technical – in these difficult and sensitive tasks. But our guiding principle should be to assist in creating the conditions that will allow Afghans themselves to take full charge of these issues.

Throughout almost a quarter century of conflict, the international community virtually abandoned Afghanistan to its suffering. The country is still emerging from conflict, and remains divided and destroyed. But with the change in political climate and a peace process in place, the world is showing renewed interest.

Afghans recognize that they need external assistance in order to consolidate the peace, and have, therefore, invited us into their country. But with this invitation comes great responsibility. We must resist that temptation to “do more with less”, but, rather, should learn the lessons of the past and try to “do less with more”.

If we exercise our responsibility wisely, we could bring untold benefits to the people of Afghanistan, and help them get back on the road to a peaceful, stable and prosperous future.