TRANSCRIPT

Antonio Maria Costa: Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon, on behalf of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. I’m here to inform you about the outcome of our annual survey of opium cultivation in Afghanistan. The news is very bad. On the opium front, today, in some of the provinces of Afghanistan, we face a state of emergency. Opium cultivation in Afghanistan has increased by almost 60 per cent - 59 per cent in 2006 - to an all-time high of 165,000 hectares. Last year, I’d like to remind you, the cultivation was 104,000 hectares. That is a crop of staggering amount - 6,100 metric tons, which is well above - 30 per cent above – world demand. Afghanistan now produces 92 per cent, basically the total, almost the total of the world’s supply of opium.

Where and why? These are probably your questions. Most of the increase is taking place in the southern provinces. For example, in Helmand the cultivation has increased by 162 per cent, which is almost 3 times the national average. Helmand itself accounts for half the increase in opium cultivation in Afghanistan. Therefore, in the southern provinces the situation is out of control. And we have to try to understand what has happened. Why such a dramatic increase? I believe the connection between insecurity and drug cultivation is a key explanation, at least in the southern provinces.

In other parts of the country, the situation is somewhat better. We have five, actually six with Kabul, six opium-free provinces; in eight provinces, there has been a decline; in Nangarhar, the major decrease of last year was not upset. So the situation in some parts of the country is not very different from the previous year; in some cases, even better.

Clearly worrisome is also the situation in Badakhshan, where there is no insurgency, at least no Taliban-type insurgency. There is a lot of resistance to the Government; there is a lot of warlordism; there are cases of corruption; poverty is rampant; drought has been a characteristic for quite some time in the province. That is a province that has also become problematic.

In the remaining provinces, which do produce significant amounts but not record levels of opium, we do see the question of the poverty of farmers, the greed of farmers, including the big landlords. We see corruption; we see the role played by corrupt governors or officials, whether Government officials or provincial administration officials, or police officials. We do see a major problem of inadequate governance, which is facilitating the endurance of opium cultivation in these provinces.

So, is the situation hopeless? If you consider that opium is the largest employer in Afghanistan; opium is the largest income generator in Afghanistan; opium is the largest source of capital in Afghanistan; opium is the single biggest export of Afghanistan; opium is the main source of foreign investment in Afghanistan; is the situation hopeless? My answer is no, and I will try to elaborate on why it is not. So this is what I have been discussing in my official meetings, and in my unofficial meetings. This is what the United Nations would like to submit to you, and through you, to public attention.

First and foremost, there is no single [fix] regarding opium in Afghanistan. There are a variety of situations. We need to be able to remunerate, to recognize the provinces that are opium free, or the provinces that are struggling to maintain and reduce opium cultivation. Therefore, I would like to propose to you, and I’ve done so to the Government, and I would say with interesting commentary, about regaining a progressively opium-free Afghanistan by recovering province by province, so that we can focus in a short amount of time – in 2 years or 3 years – to 2 or 3 provinces out of control. We can then deal with them deliberately and forcefully.

This of course means recognizing good governors when they are competent and committed, and when they deliver results in fighting narcotics. It also means removing and perhaps arresting the government officials, and provincial officials, who are not living up to the commitments they made to the President.

Second, we insist on arresting and bringing to justice the 100 most serious drug traffickers and opium farmers. We propose to seize their assets and redistribute them to the people of Afghanistan, in particular the land. You may ask, why 100? The answer is very simple. We have prepared a maximum-security wing in the “Grand Hotel” Pul-i-Charki. It has 100 beds; we want these 100 beds to be taken up in the next few months.

I already mentioned the removal of officials found guilty of corruption. There is the equally serious problem of warlords, and landlords, who are absentees and who play a role in facilitating, promoting the cultivation of their land by sharecropping. We therefore need to accelerate the disarmament and demobilization of militia. We need to shrink the pool of people who have a vested interest in the opium economy.

Finally, there is the question of eradication. We at the United Nations take no part in the eradication; we monitor it, because we have not been asked to do so. But we believe there is a role to be played. Eradication means destroying the crops that are the result of an illegal activity. The law of the land forbids the cultivation of opium.

In closing, let me remind us all that the control of opium cultivation in Afghanistan is a shared responsibility. It is not only a problem of Afghanistan; it is also a problem of the international community. Has Afghanistan received a significant amount of foreign aid? The answer is affirmative. Has Afghanistan received on a per capita basis as much aid as other post-conflict nations? The answer is negative. And even the funds that have been made available have been delayed by bureaucratic complication, by corrupt intermediaries, or misused by incompetent officials, whether Afghans or not. We need to streamline so that the money that is made available reaches the ordinary Afghans and the farmers, who are the ultimate beneficiaries. And to the extent to which insecurity, insurgency, terrorism are an explanation of the increase of opium cultivation in the southern parts of Afghanistan, we need much stronger, forceful measures to improve security. Otherwise, I’m afraid, we are going to face a dramatic situation of failed regions, districts, and even provinces, in the near future.

Habibullah Qaderi: (translated from Dari) Our meetings always begin with a point that brings happiness. But unfortunately, I must admit that we must start our meeting with a point that is not a happy one. As Mr. Costa pointed out, unfortunately, Afghanistan this year produced 60 per cent more opium than in previous years. We all know that the production of poppy has been a disgrace to Afghanistan, earning a bad name for the country. Unfortunately, since the poppy cultivation has not decreased but has increased, the disgrace of the country has also increased.

As Mr. Costa pointed out, one of the main reasons why is insecurity. Not a single Afghan wants to have a bad name for the country. Every Afghan’s wish is to have security in the country, prosperity for the people and well-being for the nation. The last survey showed that more than 120,000 Afghans were drug addicts. And no doubt, when there is more cultivation and production of drugs, there is more addiction on the part of the people as well. And our economy becomes more crime-based. For the whole country, and especially for the Ministry of Counter Narcotics, it is a setback.

The figures and statistics announced by Mr. Costa today… I don’t want to repeat them. Of course the reasons were also spelled out. The results have led to a re-doubling of the commitment of the Government, and especially the Ministry of Counter Narcotics. We are trying in many ways to campaign against drugs. I hope that within 5 years, we will have succeeded in our goals and in our strategies. I will not take up more of your time, so if there are any questions, please raise them.

Questions and Answers

Question: (translated from Dari) Mr. Qaderi, what is your specific problem in the way to contain these drugs? Do you have similar difficulties within this regard the way Mr. Jalali had with President Karzai?

Habibullah Qaderi: (translated from Dari) We discussed and presented the figures to President Karzai. Mr. Costa clearly pointed out that there is an increase in the cultivation of opium in the southern part of the country, and unfortunately since one year ago this is where we have seen a deteriorating situation. In other parts where there is security, but still drugs have increased there is the question of alternative livelihoods, that is also part of the reason, and the third reason is corruption. The increase in Helmand means there is a direct relationship between drug increase and insecurity.

Question: Is there something similar to the factors which were making Mr. Jalali less effective in controlling against drugs? Are there similar pressures against you?

Habibullah Qaderi: No, there is no such pressure against me. If there was such pressure I would quit at once.

Question: What was President Karzai’s reaction when you presented him with the survey results?

Antonio Maria Costa: At the cost of disappointing the journalists reluctantly I am forced to not answer your question. I am well known to get tough questions and answer them, but I have to protect the highest office in the country and what President Karzai said about it, you will have to ask him. My apologies.

Question: I’m not sure if I understood correctly, but you said there was still a five-year target for getting rid of opium in Afghanistan. Given it that it took 20 years in Thailand and Pakistan, are you revising this and looking for something more realistic? Can I get a comment from both of you?

Habibullah Qaderi: In five years we will be able to control it.

Question: What does that mean?

Habibullah Qaderi: I don’t know, you may know the English word ‘control’ because I’m an Afghan, I only know that much. Control means to solve the problem, in a way. I think we said control

Antonio Maria Costa: Perhaps if I could add a few comments because we have many years of experience worldwide in drug control. I don’t think the government of Afghanistan has established a five year plan to render the country opium-free. And your point, Rachel, is absolutely right. Actually in Thailand it took longer than 23 years. It took a few months longer. It took 15-18 years in Turkey and in Pakistan. It has taken a long time in Central America – I’m talking about different drugs now, cocaine. I think that despite some emotional statements at times by politicians that there won’t be a single stem of opium left the next year, which are comprehensible emotional outbursts, I believe that we have to factor in some expectations, but on the side of the press as well as public opinion that it is going to possibly take 20 years to get rid of the problem.

Habibullah Qaderi: One thing I would like to add is that sometimes the words are confusing. I would agree with Costa that it might take 20 years, but I have faced many times criticism from the farmers that ‘you want to wait 20 years to solve the problem, it means you will allow people to grow?’ So, we are facing problems from all sides. That is why we always try to talk about shorter periods.

Question: (translated from Dari) You mentioned that one of the reasons for the increase in opium cultivation is insecurity. But some believe that the drug is caused by insecurity and also if corrupt officials are not removed from power, will there be security as long as these people are in power?

Antonio Maria Costa: You are right, all three factors are the ones I mentioned - insecurity, opium, and corruption – we have to look at the different situation of individual provinces, or regions, if you wish. In the southern provinces, corruption is rampant. We recognize that one of the reasons why the Governor of Helmand was removed, and actually the final period of the Governor of Helmand in power between September and December last year is what caused a massive planting which became the massive harvest of 2006. But in the southern provinces the most serious nexus is the one between insurgency and opium cultivation.

There are a variety of channels which this interaction can be manifested. First, the insurgency derived a significant amount of revenue after the crop cultivation and above all the labs, and in particular the transportation. We were given evidence of insurgents boarding convoys with narcotics heading south and southwest. As a way of protecting the convoy along the route in exchange for a share of the revenue which is derived by selling the merchandise.

There is a second perhaps more subtle, more pernicious way for insurgency to play a role, namely by promoting the cultivation just as a way of creating an underground economy, an illegal economy, creating an embarrassment to the government if you wish, hoping for a strong interoperation against the cultivation so as to increase the army of possible recruiters to themselves. It’s a very subtle, but extremely dangerous way the insurgency can impact the cultivation.

Third, obviously as you mentioned, corruption is rampant. Corruption is the main lubricant to illegal activity anywhere in the world. It is the main lubricant, not to the cultivation, but to the profiteering from the cultivation, to the processing in illegal labs, to the transportation, to the export of the commodity. We have Governors involved. We have provincial administrations involved. We have police officials. We have army officials. And of course the usual drivers and everybody else in different functions which are facilitating the economy of opium at the time.

Question: (translation from Dari) I’ve been receiving reports from the start of the year that there have been measures and efforts, both by the government and the United Nations regarding fighting opium. As we heard from your survey, all the efforts have not been useful in reducing the opium cultivation, because in every region government officials are doing the best they can. Do you think these efforts have been sufficient?

Antonio Maria Costa: I think this is the most important question. Money is being poured in. Coalition forces are operating. Capacity building has been the main goal of the United Nations. The strategies are in place. The London Compact is in place, yet still opium cultivation grows by 60 percent. Should the strategy be changed? Dumped? Of course not. The strategy is nothing more and nothing less than a similar package of initiatives which we have undertaken in many other countries which had seriously equal problems and we were able to contain it. But a strategy is something which consists of various elements whose importance changes over time and over space and I would like to spend a couple of minutes if you allow me because this is the key point.

Between 2002 and 2004 it [the situation] has deteriorated significantly, obviously, in particular in the southern provinces. The strengthening of NATO forces in the southern part of the country is very recent, the British forces arrived just a few days / weeks ago, obviously after the crop was indeed harvested. We have been meeting with ISAF, we have been pleading not only for stronger security, but also some sort of a role by coalition forces, ISAF forces, in fighting, not the cultivation, but certainly the trafficking, the processes and the exporting of opium.

The third element of the strategy is governance - clean hands - clean Government. We need much more committed and results-based initiatives on the part of the Government to fight corruption.

Cultivation is very mobile – it moves from province to province fast, after all, this is not cocaine where the plant is twenty-five years old. This is an annual plant, it can be planted here and tomorrow there and the cultivation does follow the patterns of corruption throughout the country.

Finally, the fourth point, the strategy is very balanced, it insists on the reduction of supply, but also on reducing demand and calls on the consuming nations to reduce their demand, insists on the importance of reducing demand, especially in the markets of Europe, Russia, China, Central Asia and Iran, in particular, those are the major consuming nations of Afghan heroin.

Habibullah Qaderi: I want to point out that the measures taken in the campaign against Afghan poppy cultivation, I would say that these projects were insufficient because there was more need for encouragement, a need for more incentives to give to the farmers to stop cultivating this crop.

Another point, is that the international community should assist the Government in giving more projects so that the capacity within the Government will be developed and promoted.

We see that very expensive projects are being implemented by the international community. If these projects were allowed to be carried out by the Government, there will be less [inaudible] as well as more capacity and promotion within the Government.

You said that there are people in the provinces, everywhere at the district level and provincial level there are people who encourage in fact the cultivation of poppy and causes the increase in production. I agree with that, but measures have been taken within the justice system. There has been an improvement in the Prosecutor’s Office, I hope there is an improvement in the Ministry of Interior staff and people who are the district administrators, the Chiefs of Police in the districts – that is what we need the Ministry of the Interior to hopefully bring in those areas.

Question: Mr. Costa said he wanted to see the 100 beds filled in the high security prison in the next few months. Is the Government capable of doing that and do you have the will?

Habibullah Qaderi: I think we have the will and as Mr. Costa said there are 100 beds, but I don’t think that we have the capacity to fill them all.

Antonio Maria Costa: You see my fear, Carlotta, is that the Pul-i-Charki jail will be filled with low-level drug traffickers, drivers for example. We should remind ourselves and perhaps to our Afghan counterparts that the maximum security prison was set-up only for the very major cases and that is what we want to see addressed in terms of filling up the premises which should be ready in the next month or so.

Habibullah Qaderi: I hope we can do something, but I would like to be much more practical and realistic because as Mr. Costa said, most of the drugs are being smuggled by the carriers, the drivers, not by the big fishes. Now, against the big fishes you need to find evidence, you must have evidence, only then is it possible to bring them to justice. So that will take time. And to find evidence against these people you must have the capacity, the capacity to find out their property, their assets, the capacity to know how much money they own, the capacity to find out about the communications they have when they are dealing with drugs. So, all these things need capacity, which for the time being, the Afghan Government does not have. And we hope the international community will help us in this way and in this direction.

Question: Mr. Costa you said that the Governor of Helmand has been removed because he was involved with [inaudible], but he has been appointed by the President as a representative of the Upper House of Parliament. What does that tell you about the will of the President and the Government?

Antonio Maria Costa: I have been on the record for asking the President that corrupt officials not be moved around, but to be removed. To be neutralized if records can prove convictions and they be arrested and convicted. So far we do not have much evidence of that and we hope that more forceful initiatives will be undertaken exactly in that area.

Question: (translated from Dari) His question is regarding Senlis, a French organization working for the legalization of opium. Is the international community agreeing with their plans or supporting them?

Antonio Maria Costa: No, it’s all wrong. Senlis is not asking for legalization, it’s asking for the purchase of opium through legal channels to then transform into a pharmaceutical morphine.

We have deliberately addressed this point in the penultimate paragraph of the press release when we say that the Afghan Government, the Parliament and partner nations have made it clear that legalizing cultivation or buying up the opium crop for medical purposes is not an option under current circumstances.

The price differential between legal markets where opium sells for about US$20 – $30 per kilo, and the illegal one, where opium sells for over US$100 per kilo, would lead to even greater cultivation and the massive divergence towards the black market.

Furthermore, I would add, there is no scarcity of morphine worldwide at least in terms of current demand from hospitals. And the current production of opium in Afghanistan would fill about five years of the morphine need worldwide.

Thank you.

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