Briefing by Mr. Tom Koenigs
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan
to
the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Afghanistan
TOM KOENIGS, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of UNAMA, said Afghanistan remained a place of hope and challenge as unprecedented efforts to improve governance, help development and register military gains were being put to the test. While the conflict continued in the south, the need for strategic coordination of military, political and development efforts was stronger than ever. While the threat to peace had not diminished, the joint response by Afghan institutions, by NATO/ISAF, by donors and by the Afghan people was encouraging.
He said coordination efforts could be improved further. JCMB was the principal framework guiding the Government and the international community in the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact. It was crucial to ensure that the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) worked well and delivered. Afghan ministries were currently drafting their five-year strategies. He was counting on the Council’s support in that regard. “To be candid”, he said, “international participation needs to improve.” He requested that all donors ensured meaningful participation in ANDS, starting immediately in the run up to the Afghanistan Development Forum to be held on 30 April and the fifth JCMB meeting on 1 May.
The Afghan National Assembly, he continued, needed to become more engaged in the Compact’s implementation by including relevant discussions in its plenary agenda. Many other wings of the Government, including the Ministry of the Interior, would need to take more seriously their responsibilities under the Compact. “The continued passivity of many Government agencies –- in the expectation that the international community will come to their rescue to meet the Compact objectives -– only serves to delay progress and in some cases undermines it.” It was of fundamental importance that the Government took seriously the issue of top-down reform of key ministries, particularly the Ministry of the Interior. Improved utilization of development aid and accelerated budget execution, together with a strengthened international military presence and reinforced Afghan security forces, remained key prerequisites for the success of both development and military efforts during 2007.
He said ISAF, together with Afghan national security forces, were engaged in large-scale operations against Taliban forces. Past experience indicated that intensified violence could be expected as the weather got warmer and spring began. The ability of Taliban forces to acquire and retain the military initiative was now under active challenge in many districts, however. Its symbiotic relationship with drug-trafficking networks in Helmand had been exposed as never before. Moreover, the Taliban model of governance remained broadly unpopular. He welcomed the commitment of new forces to ISAF, which would generate a credible theatre reserve for the first time.
As military action increased, he said, the protection of civilians had emerged as a burning concern. Taliban-led terrorist and insurgent groups bore sole responsibility for the high toll of deaths and injuries caused by suicide bombings. There had also been a number of cases of civilian casualties caused by Government and international forces. Beyond the tragic loss of innocent human life, the resulting disaffection and civil unrest, loss of public support, as well as victims’ right to justice, place the international effort under additional stress. The United Nations Mission had aimed to position itself as an impartial and credible advocate on behalf of civilians by conducting objective verifications of those incidents and sharing the information with key actors.
As a complement to military action, he went on, there was considerable potential for improved security through political outreach to disaffected tribal groups and commanders. There were signs that more groups than ever were receptive to the Afghan Government’s overtures when they were credibly made. However, a number of provincial governors continued to underperform in that respect. Support to the provinces from the central Government was sometimes insufficient, as was shown by the current situation in Helmand province. A credible strategy was urgently needed to enlist support of tribal leaders and their communities. A successful counter-narcotics policy in Helmand, Uruzgan and elsewhere would depend on the reestablishment of governance and strong community engagement. The new UNAMA provincial offices were meant to open doors and initiate dialogue with a wide variety of groups whose role would be critical in ending the conflict.
He said the Policy Action Group (PAG), led by President Karzai, must be made increasingly operational at the provincial level. There was a strategic consensus on the need to disrupt Taliban leadership networks. The continuing impunity of terrorist networks based in Waziristan but operating in Afghanistan remained of high concern. He welcomed as a very positive step the recent arrest of Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, the former Taliban Minister of Defence and a key figure on the sanctions list established under resolution 1267. Regional cooperation remained essential to resolving the insurgency. Existing practical initiatives to increase regional trust and dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan –- notably in infrastructure, health and private sector development –- could be further developed as confidence-building measures.
On 10 March, the Wolesi Jirga had approved a revised “Reconciliation and General Amnesty Bill” that grants amnesty to all political and belligerent groups involved in the armed conflict before establishment of the Interim Administration in 2001. If the right of individuals to seek justice with respect to individual crimes was not affected, that initiative was welcome. The principal framework for action in that area remained the Action Plan on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation, launched on 10 December 2006. The key elements of the Action Plan included establishing the truth about atrocities committed between 1978 and the fall of the Taliban, measures to honour victims, reconciliation initiatives and recommendations for an accountability mechanism.
He said counter-narcotics efforts continued to be an area of utmost strategic priority. Initial reports indicated that there would be a record poppy harvest in 2007. Eradication was ongoing, but did not have a critical impact in the southern provinces. A significant decrease was expected in the north, where incentives had succeeded and governance had been strengthened. Eradication activities must be accompanied by both effective alternative livelihood programmes and enforcement measures against drug networks.
Widespread corruption within the justice sector was also a major concern and the reform process urgently needed to address the issue of low salaries for judges and prosecutors, he said. There was a strong case for the establishment of some form of multi-donor funding to meet those costs. The justice institutions would need further restructuring and reform for greater accountability, improved service delivery, better resources and security for justice officials.
In conclusion, he raised the issue of the continued lack of a secure environment that severely limited the ability of UNAMA to implement its mandate and exposed its staff to considerable risk. Recruiting and retaining qualified staff represented a major challenge. That issue had to be addressed, also in terms of financial resources.
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