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Mr President,
Distinguished members of the Council,

Thank you for this opportunity to brief you at this early date on developments in Afghanistan and our plans for the coming months. It is gratifying that the Council has put Afghanistan as one of the very first subjects on this year’s agenda. The presidential election on 9 October and the recent appointment of the cabinet have brought with them new momentum in the Afghan peace process. It is very important for the Afghans and for us in the international community to take full advantage of this circumstance, to move the Bonn agenda forcefully, and to fulfill as much as possible the broad objectives of the transition.

Cabinet
As you are aware, on 7 December President Karzai was sworn in, together with his two vice-presidents. Before and after his inauguration, the President held protracted consultations regarding the formation of his cabinet. This has been a complex exercise involving on the one hand the need to increase the number of qualified professionals to head the Ministries – a requirement implicit in the Constitution that provides for all Ministers to have higher education, and a strong popular demand – and, on the other hand, the need to ensure adequate political and ethnic representation. The outcome of these consultations was made public on 23 December. The composition of the 27-member cabinet does meet the requirements of the Afghan constitution, and all ministers have higher education and hold only Afghan citizenship. It also reflects broadly the ethnic composition of the country, with ten Pashtuns, eight Tajiks, five Hazaras, two Uzbeks, one Turkmen and one Baloch. Three women are in the cabinet - among them is the only female presidential candidate, Masuda Jalal.

Of course, the composition of the cabinet will not escape criticism from one quarter or another. But consultations held by UNAMA with political parties, representatives of civil society and communities in various regions indicate that a majority of Afghans welcome the composition of the new cabinet and see it as a sign of the national character of the Government. This is in contrast to the mitigated – and sometimes critical - reaction in public opinion after the 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga, who many saw as overly influenced by factional considerations and a missed opportunity to establish a truly representative central government. This vote of confidence in the new Cabinet will no doubt increase the authority and effectiveness of the Government as it tackles some very complex, urgent and difficult tasks on the national agenda, including the holding of local and parliamentary elections, expanded disarmament and demobilization, and counter-narcotics.

Election Preparations
Let me turn to the first of these tasks. You may recall that, with your endorsement, the electoral commission decided last year to split the electoral process in two and indicated that the parliamentary elections would be held in the month of Saur1383 - that is between 21 April and 21 May 2005. A variety of considerations were behind this decision. One concerned a number of key legal and administrative prerequisites that were not met on time; another one related to the need to bring about further disarmament and a political environment conducive to free and transparent elections, in particular at provincial and district level where the militarization inherited from decades of war was most likely to affect and distort the electoral process. The electoral commission and ourselves also felt that given the complete absence of any electoral tradition and practice in Afghanistan, the relatively simpler presidential election would serve well all the actors involved in an election as a rehearsal for the much more complex set of elections involved in the parliamentary process. In this respect, all observer organizations – international and domestic – have issued useful recommendations that are being taken into account in the ongoing preparation of the upcoming elections.

The centerpiece of this preparation is the establishment of the Independent Electoral Commission called for by the Constitution. Its appointment, which is a presidential prerogative, is an opportunity to implement some of the lessons learned from the presidential election, and in particular the need for closer consultation with the large number of new political parties – 50 - that have been registered since last year and need to develop more confidence in the operation of the electoral authority. In the last few weeks we have been working with the President’s office to elicit the views and recommendations of political parties and community leaders on this matter; and we can expect that the new Commission will be appointed in the very near future.

In addition to the creation of a new Independent Electoral Commission, we expect that the parliamentary elections will see an enhanced role of Afghans throughout the process. It will be the case with the organization of electoral operations, where overall the Afghan personnel has performed well during the presidential exercise. And it will also be the case with domestic observation and political parties. Indeed, local elections will take the electoral competition to many parts of the country to which international observers are unlikely to have access. Domestic observers and the action of party monitors will therefore bear much of the responsibility to ensure that local elections are fair and credible. The presidential election was, from this viewpoint, a promising start. We expect therefore that the recruitment and training of these observers and monitors will play a major role in safeguarding the integrity of the upcoming electoral process.

In order to meet the April-May target date, the Government and the electoral authorities have to make a number of decisions - on the participation of refugees and nomads; the demarcation of district boundaries; the population figures per province; the preparation of voters’ lists, and the revisions of the electoral law. The most urgent of these decisions concerns the assignment of population settlements to districts, which, under the electoral law, must be completed 120 days before election day. For elections to take place within the agreed timeframe, district boundaries must therefore be finalized within the next couple of weeks at the latest. The Ministry of Interior, who is in the lead for this process, has indicated that good progress has been made and it is hoped that decisions are imminent. One important outstanding piece of legislation concerns the powers of the local councils that are to be elected together with the representatives to the Lower House. The creation of elected bodies at district and provincial level is an innovation in the Afghan political system brought about by the new Constitution. Their functions relative to existing administrative structures must be defined well ahead of the elections. A UNDP mission on local governance that visited Afghanistan last month has recommended a gradualist approach to the empowerment of these bodies. More specifically, it suggested that, for the time being, the councils could be given an advisory role to the executive bodies at local level – in addition to their constitutional role to elect members of the Upper House. Further consultations must take place on this very important subject before a decision is made by the Government, if only for the limited purpose of the 2005 election.

This complex preparatory work is pursued with the April-May target in mind, and a final decision on the election date will have to be made by the new Independent Electoral Commission in the next few weeks. Political leaders and representatives of the international community agree that the gap between presidential and parliamentary elections should be kept to a minimum, but they have also noted that this should not be achieved at the expense of a well-organized and transparent election with adequate time for technical and political requirements to be properly met.

With regard to the management of electoral operations, the prevalent view held among political leaders and in observer reports is that the electoral commission and its operational staff must be more effectively integrated than was the case in the presidential election. We have also streamlined international support to electoral operations in order to capitalize on the proven strengths of each international partner. UNDP will continue to oversee trust fund management and donor relations, in addition to contributing to support electoral observation and building over the longer term the capacity of the electoral commission. UNOPS – which has demonstrated its flexibility in administrative and logistical matters – will be the executing agency for all budget lines.

This brings me to the important matter of funding required for the holding of the 2005 elections. Depending of the date when they will be held, it is estimated that between 120 and 130 million US dollars will be need to cover the three elections. If the government should decide to hold out-of-country elections in Iran and Pakistan, at least an additional 30 million US dollars would need to be added to this estimate. UNDP is in the process of closing the books of the voter registration and presidential election projects. Once this is completed, left over funds will be allocated to the parliamentary elections. We will make appeals to the international community for the remainder of the funding needed as soon as the date of elections is decided, since different timeframes require different budgets.

I should add that, from the operational point of view, it is anticipated that the modalities for the 2005 elections will follow closely the 2004 elections. The location and number of polling sites – 25 000 - was based on registration figures and proposals from communities. There is therefore no reason to alter these basic parameters. Similarly, logistical arrangements for the deployment of personnel and material will be, in the main, replicated with the assistance of the coalition and ISAF.

Turning to the issue of security, the deployment of the national army and professional police will gain additional importance for parliamentary elections, where close to 400 district elections will need to be secured. I am pleased to report that the Afghan National Army, currently at 28 battalions – a force of approximately 17,000 – is expected to increase to 32 battalions by April, and 39 battalions by July. The size of the reformed and trained Afghan National Police is expected to increase from about 32,000 now to over 37,000 by April and over 45,000 by July.

While the Afghan police and army will play a major role in the 2005 elections, as they did in 2004, international forces will remain indispensable for providing security and backing up national forces. ISAF and the Coalition have indicated their full support for the next election and have noted that their most urgent requirement is that an electoral timeframe be in place as soon as possible in order to enable them to adjust their plans to the final electoral calendar. In any event, the electoral commission will need to bear a number of security factors in mind – including the current plan of rotations, ISAF expansion to the West, and ANA and ANP development and deployment - when it makes a final decision on the election date.

Finally we must have in mind the type of security challenges that the UN will be facing. While the abduction of three UN electoral workers in October was brought to a successful conclusion and while the overall security environment has shown signs of improvement in recent weeks, the kidnapping and killing of a UNOPS sub-contracted personnel on 15 December is a reminder of the possibility that the targeting of international personnel could occur again and perhaps become more routine once winter conditions recede and the movement of anti-government forces become easier. This issue must be tackled in a comprehensive manner, lest it undermine the capability of UNAMA and other agencies to fulfill their mandate and threaten the organization of parliamentary elections. To address this serious concern, the UN Country Team in Afghanistan has completed a comprehensive security assessment exercise. Its overall conclusions are that the security situation remains very diverse in the different parts of the country; that adequate measures must be made taken that will provide the UN agencies (and the electoral operations) accessibility to risk-prone regions; and that the strict observance of minimum operational security standards that enabled the UN to carry out humanitarian, reconstruction and electoral activities in 2004 should enable us to operate in the same manner in 2005. Given resources, discipline and adequate information and analysis, and of course given the indispensable support by national and international security agencies, the UN will therefore should be able to deploy as required in 2005, and, hopefully, to provide support to the electoral process in all provinces.

Mr. President,

Let me turn now to developments in other areas that will have a direct impact on the environment in which the elections will take place.

Counter-narcotics
You are well aware that the narcotics industry and accompanying corruption are now clearly one of the biggest threats to the building of an effective, democratic Afghan state and the country’s long-term peace and stability. Opium cultivation remains one of the largeest sources of illegal income and serves to support criminal and factional agendas that aim to undermine the central government.

One of the most worrying aspects of the narcotics industry is how much the Afghan economy, and therefore the population, depend on it. Valued in 2004 at 2.8 billion dollars, the opium economy is now equivalent to about 60% of Afghanistan’s GDP. It is estimated that in 2004, 356,000 families were involved in opium poppy production, an increase of 35% from 2003. Poppy cultivation has also spread to 34 provinces and accounts for 56% of the total cultivated land.

The central government has shown a commitment to tackling the problem. We welcome the recent establishment of a new Ministry of Counter-narcotics and are hopeful that it will improve coordination among the various initiatives being undertaken in the fields of eradication and interdiction.

In an effort to establish the elimination of drugs as a national priority, in December President Karzai convened a national conference on counter-narcotics in Kabul, attended by governors, chiefs of provincial police departments, tribal elders from throughout the country, relevant ministries, representatives of donor countries, UN agencies and international NGOs. President Karzai spoke resolutely about the need to eliminate the drug problem from Afghanistan, warning that Afghanistan could very well become a pariah state should counter-narcotics efforts fail. Since this event, significant numbers of farmers in the East and South have been replacing poppy with wheat. This is, of course, a very welcome development even if the extent to which these initiatives will make a dent in poppy production can only be determined during the harvesting month in April.

At the same national conference, the government officially launched the national counter-narcotics eradication programme, which is due to focus on seven key provinces in a staggered fashion until July 2005 - Helmand, Nangarhar, Badakhshan, Balkh, Samangan, Bamyan, Wardak. The national programme will include the provision of alternative livelihoods for poppy-growing farmers, the extension of drug law enforcement, the implementation of drug control legislation, the establishment of effective institutions, and the introduction of prevention and treatment programmes for addicts. Governor-led programmes will also be implemented in the other provinces. In order to counter-balance the potentially negative impact of eradication initiatives, it is critical that alternative livelihood programmes be strengthened and made known to affected communities. It is also crucial that the government develop further its ongoing counter-narcotics public information campaign and disseminates its messages through traditional and community-based channels.

In order to address the magnitude of the problem, much more will have to be done by the international community to assist the government in its interdiction efforts and in the creation of alternative livelihood programmes. At a time when Afghan national security capacity is still limited, the international military presence can also play a major role in assisting the government to fight against drug traffickers and clandestine laboratories.

Finally, it is also important to note that at various stages, the counter-narcotics campaign will come into contact with preparations for parliamentary and local elections. The voter education programme, for example, will be carried out throughout the period of eradication. Coordination between these two efforts is vital to avoid adding tensions to an already complex and competitive electoral environment.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Mr. President,

I mentioned earlier that disarmament and demobilization had been a key consideration in deciding on the date and modalities of the elections. Indeed, it has been and remains a constant concern of Afghans that elections should take place when a proper political environment has been created through DDR. This concerns applies particularly to local elections where a web of political interests and armed groups could significantly distort the electoral process.

You will recall that in the last briefing to the Security Council on Afghanistan, two months ago, we reported that 22,000 ex-combatants had been disarmed, and 75% of the total number of heavy weapons in the country had been cantoned. I am pleased to inform you that significant further progress has been made in the past few weeks under the combined influence of the momentum generated by the presidential election, concerted action of the Ministry of Defense and the international community under the lead of the Government of Japan, and the active involvement of the Ministry of Finance in cutting financial and technical resources to decommissioned units. By now, 33,000 militiamen [have been disarmed and the heavy weapons cantonment programme is almost complete. Over 63,000 names have been removed from the payroll, which, to a large extent, included ghost units rather than real militia forces. Given the rate of actual disarmament compared to the official strength of militia forces, we can now assume that of the residual (approximately) 40,000 names on the original militia lists, only 20 to 30,000 really exist and are yet to be disarmed. If the DDR momentum is sustained and if the remaining obstacles are removed, we can therefore reasonably expect disarmament and demobilization of the Afghan Militia Forces to be completed according to the schedule established at the Berlin Conference last year, that is by June 2005 – with reintegration activities for those demobilised continuing till 2006.

Improved access to large stocks of heavy weapons and ammunition in areas where cantonment operations had been previously hampered – particularly Herat, Mazar and the North-West – has accelerated progress of this important aspect of DDR. Throughout Afghanistan, ANBP – the UN DDR programme - has cantoned and disabled close to 8,000 heavy weapons thus far. This figure vastly exceeds the surveyed total of operational and repairable heavy weapons in the country, originally estimated at approximately 4,200. Cantonment is complete in the East, South-East, South, North-West and Central Highlands.

Access has also been gained to large stocks of ammunition in areas previously off limits to disarmament activities. These stocks proved to be much larger (and often more dangerous) than expected, and pose considerable challenges in terms of disposal, or storage for the purpose of re-utilisation by the Afghan National Army. The Ministry of Defense, with the support of the international community under Canada’s lead has embarked on the complex task of managing the discovered ammunition. An ammunition survey has begun in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat, the two locations considered to have the most substantial stocks. Shortly, two more survey teams will be deployed to Kandahar and Kunduz. Known ammunition in remaining areas is under Coalition Forces oversight.

It is important to note that DDR has been particularly successful in Northern Afghanistan. The requirement under the political party law that units with links to political organizations must comply with DDR before the latter are cleared to be registered as political parties, has resulted in considerable disarmament in this area. In particular, practically all military divisions under the control of General Dostum have now entered DDR and opened the way for his political formation – Jumbesh – to participate fully in the electoral process. Broad disarmament will hopefully contribute to stabilize a region that has been especially prone to inter-factional conflict in the last three years.

On the other hand, a few obstacles remain: some of the militia units based in Kabul city and scheduled to be disarmed in the current phase of the programme – namely Divisions 1 and 8 – have not yet complied or have only partly complied with the basic requirements of DDR. In the case of Division 10, after some delays, lists of men to be demobilized have been provided and there will be an important opportunity for disarmament later this week. Considerable delays have also occurred in the cantonment of the last significant group of heavy weapons not yet under the control of the central government – those in the Panshjir Valley, where there are reports of large stocks of ammunition as well. Yesterday, ANBP was finally allowed to begin cantonment operations in this area. This is a welcome development and we hope that in a few weeks they will be cleared of heavy weapons.

Let me take also this opportunity to flag the importance of providing the DDR programme with adequate resources. Unless fresh funds to cover the cost of running a complex disarmament operation, and of reintegrating disarmed ex-combatants, are immediately provided to ANBP, the programme will suffer delays and the momentum built since the presidential election may be lost.

In this context, it is important to recall that since its inception in 2003 the DDR programme has focused on militia forces that, while often under the control of local power holders, were formally affiliated with and on the payroll of the Ministry of Defense. While this DDR programme is progressing well, a large number of miscellaneous irregular forces were not included in the programme and continue to exist throughout the country. Some – although not all – are among the main sources of insecurity and human rights abuses in certain parts of the country, and their activities are frequently linked to drug cultivation and trade. In order to create a secure environment for parliamentary elections, the problem of irregular militias has therefore to be tackled as a matter of priority by the new government with the support of the international community.

To this end – in coordination with the government – ANBP, ISAF and the Coalition Forces have almost completed a nationwide mapping exercise of irregular militias, based on information from various intelligence sources, including the national security agencies. Mapping includes not only an assessment of the size of irregular forces and indications about their geographical locations, but also their inclusion into five different categories: (i) autonomous and organized militias which can destabilise their areas in varying degrees – ranging from rogue groups to community-based self-defense forces; (ii) groups linked to individuals employed in the government security sector who are involved in illegal activities and human rights violations; (iii) groups involved in counter-terrorist activities alongside international forces and the national army; (iv) groups employed as security forces to guard reconstruction projects; (v) a last category is represented by groups or individuals that have already expressed the wish to give up weapons and re-enter civilian life.

Based on the information provided by the mapping exercise, the government and the international community are working on a plan to disarm and reintegrate irregular militias. A few key points need to be highlighted in this respect. First, priorities are being set, with security for parliamentary elections as the main parameter to identify which groups must be tackled immediately. Second, disarmament criteria must be decided upon, including sanctions and enforcement if necessary. Third, different incentive schemes will have to be established according to categories and circumstances – it is foreseen that unlike the current DDR programme, which relies on individual reintegration packages, reintegration of irregular militias will be based primarily on community development incentives. Links with government-led national reconstruction programmes and with employment-generating projects will have to be established very rapidly. At the same time, it will be essential to decentralize the management of incentives for disarmed irregular militias to the provincial and even district level, in order to adjust projects to specific needs and circumstances, and to exploit fully local opportunities for reintegration.

Conclusion

Mr. President,

As this Council is well aware, the consolidation of peace can and will usually mean very different things in different contexts. In the case of Afghanistan, it has been the international consensus since the Bonn agreement that the principal answer to the challenges of terrorism, factionalism and the narcotics industry lies in the building of a strong, effective, balanced and representative government able to translate the will of the overwhelming majority of Afghans to live in peace under the law, protected from violent extremism and those political and ethnic divisions that have fueled the conflicts of the past two decades.

Last year’s presidential election showed the determination with which the Afghans embrace this vision. The repeated failures of extremists to derail the electoral process, combined with the better performance of security forces, point to the possibility that the current improvement in the overall security situation will be sustained. Further DDR will create a better environment not only for the upcoming elections, but also for the expansion of civilian administration, reconstruction and the restoration of the rule of law. Such advance towards the goal of an effective Afghan state is, in our view, a very real prospect. But this is no reason for complacency on the part of the international community, quite the contrary. Because such progress is predicated upon continued high level of international assistance – military, economic and political. And because the narco-economy constitutes now a distinct challenge to state-building in Afghanistan, and bringing it under control will require additional efforts by the Afghans but also by the international community.

Let me conclude, then, by calling upon the Security Council to continue, throughout 2005, to provide vigorous leadership to the international community in support of the peace process in Afghanistan.

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