I. Introduction

Mr. President,
Distinguished Members of the Council,

As this is the opportunity I have to brief the Council on the situation in Afghanistan, allow me first of all to thank the Council for the confidence they have showed me by endorsing my appointment as Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the strong support they have expressed for the work of UNAMA in their latest resolution on the extension of the Mission's mandate.

A few months separate us from the holding of the national elections that will mark the end of the Transitional Government, and I will therefore focus on the main challenges confronting the country in the preparation for this event. And in keeping with the format of previous Security Council briefings, and in view of the critical impact of security conditions on the political process, I would like to begin this briefing with a brief review of the security situation in the country.

II. Security situation

In his latest report to the Security Council last March, the Secretary-General observed that insecurity in Afghanistan continued to follow a well-known pattern. The most recent UN security map bears this out, with little change in the identification of low-risk, middle risk and high-risk provinces. Within this pattern, however, the situation has evolved negatively in recent months in the more risky areas - and in particularly in the South - with a tangible increase in the number of incidents and their toll. This increase is consistent with the spring surge in extremists' attacks that the coalition had been expecting. The modus operandi - anti-government forces operating in small groups of 10 to 20 men and targeting Afghan police, ANA, civilian administration, NGOs and government representatives - also confirms the shift in Taliban and other groups' strategy which was observed last year. According to the Coalition, various extremist groups are involved, including Taliban operating in the South; foreign fighters in the Southeast and Hezb-Islami/Hekmatiar in the East.

At the same time, one must be cautious in establishing responsibilities behind events taking place in the South, East and Southeast. Drug-related violence is an important factor of insecurity. Militias involved in combating the Taliban are widely believed to be responsible for a high percentage of incidents in the areas where they operate. A recent attack against an electoral assessment mission in the Southeast turned out to have been organized by the local Border Brigade commander, perhaps in connection with criminal activities. In addition, in the context of the ongoing DDR programme, there have been warnings that commanders targeted by DDR would get involved in incidents aimed at creating a perception of security vacuum. Finally, violent rivalries at local level also bear part of the responsibility for the overall level of insecurity.

Many of these factors are also present in other parts of the country. In particular, the province of Farah has become increasingly insecure as a result of rivalries among local factions, probably connected with drug trafficking, without ruling out some involvement of Taliban element. In the North and Northeast, tensions between the Jumbesh and Jamiat factions remain high following clashes that took place in March in the provinces of Faryab and Balkh. However, the deployment there - and in Heart - of units of the Afghan National Army have had a stabilizing impact and have prevented further escalation.

In Kabul, even though no deadly suicide attacks has taken place, like those directed against two ISAF patrols last winter, another ISAF patrol was attacked last week with rocket-propelled grenades, causing the death of one Norwegian soldier. Earlier, a rocket landed in ISAF headquarters, fortunately without fatality. In addition, in recent weeks the number of arms caches uncovered by ISAF has been increasing and multiple signs of heightened anti-government activity have appeared, indicating that the "spring surge" under way from the East to the South may be ongoing in the country's capital.

While the aid community continues to keep a low profile in insecure areas in order to reduce its vulnerability, the expanding voter registration process - to which I will come back later - has been affected by the overall increase in incidents. So far, four attacks against registration teams have involved Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) - one in the South, one in the Northeast and two in the East, fortunately without fatalities. In addition, two grenade attacks took place in Wardak and two IED were found in Logar near the registration sites.. While in part of the country, written threats have been issued against those who would participate in the electoral process, it is still unclear whether the attacks were directed against the electoral operation itself or whether they were intended, like many other similar attacks, against government targets (the Russian jeeps used by registration teams are also used by the Afghan police and the ANA).

The level of violent opposition to the electoral process is therefore still difficult to gauge, but precautions are, of course, being taken as registration is now pushing out into rural areas. In particular, close coordination has been developed with coalition forces. The deployment of a new US Marine unit in Uruzgan and Zabul has allowed the process to start there. The coalition has now re-organized its forces in three regional commands that cover the territory as a whole and liaise with the electoral authority to provide assistance when necessary. In addition, the deployment across the South, Southeast and East of a total of 10 Provincial Reconstruction Teams by the end of July will make a significant contribution to the security of the electoral process, in particular through the support they can provide to the operations of the national police. A coordination cell has been established in the Ministry of Interior, through which the police, the National Directorate for Security, the coalition and ISAF coordinate their efforts in support of the registration campaign.

III. The electoral process

Voter Registration
Upon completion in April of voter registration in the eight major population centers , the process has entered its second and final phase, which is to cover the rest of the country over the next couple of months. The second phase started with 160 sites opened in early May and has now expanded to 594 sites across 31 of the 34 provinces with 1083 teams operating simultaneously. Since the beginning of May close to one million have been registered, which brings the total number of registered voters to 2,7 million. Contrary to initial expectations, the participation of women has not dropped as voter registration expanded beyond the main urban centers. After a slow start from December to March, women's registration has picked up in the last two months, accounting now for 37-38 per cent of the registrations made over this period. However, there is still significant under-registration of women in the Southeast and East, where female registration continues to be below 30%.

As mentioned earlier, with the active support of the coalition, the high-risk provinces of Uruzgan and Zabul, which have been off-limit to international agencies for almost two years, are now open to registration, even though still on a reduced scale; and we hope to expand to the remaining high-risk provinces of Paktika and Nuristan in the coming days, as well as to the newly created province of Daikondi in the Central Highlands.

In order to meet registration targets, further expansion is planned to take place in the short term from 600 to approximately 800 sites by the first week of June. This is needed to enable voter registration to achieve the minimum required cruising speed of at least 75,000 registrations per day.

While the process is therefore well under way, a number of concerns remain. I have already mentioned the problem of security and the distinct possibility that insecurity could lead to under-registration in some provinces. The figures today are revealing: altogether the 9 provinces of the South and Southeast represent for the time being a mere 12% of registered. If this pattern should last, it would raise a second issue, namely that of the lack of balance in registration between different provinces. Ultimately, under-registration in one province relative to another should have little impact on the outcome of the elections to the Lower House since the number of seats for any one province will be based on population estimates, not registration figures.

But registration figures could have an impact on the outcome of presidential elections - in particular, if the latter should develop an ethnic/regional dimension. And, quite apart from the immediate impact on the outcome of elections, under-registration - whatever its causes - is bound to generate frustration and a suspicion that parts of the country have been deliberately disenfranchised. Much rides, therefore, on providing unsafe areas of the South with an equal opportunity to participate in the electoral process.

Another challenge relates to the determination of population figures for each province. The figures that, under the new electoral law, will be used to define the number of representatives each province will send to the Lower House are to be provided by the Central Statistical Office (CSO) based on national pre-census exercise that has been going on since September of last year. Unfortunately, again due to insecurity - five members of a survey team were killed last November in the West (Farah) and another eight were wounded in a mine accident last week in the East (Khost) -, it is now quite likely that the provinces of Zabul, Helmand, Paktika and Uruzgan will not be surveyed, or very partially. Based on the trends identified in the country as a whole, census experts are still confident that they can produce fairly reliable population figures for these four provinces, but - again - given the great sensitivity involved in all matters related to representation, this lack of survey is bound to compound the suspicion already created by low registration figures.

A third challenge has, of course, to do with funding. The voter registration itself is almost fully funded with a shortfall of just US$2.6million, but the election is only very partially funded. To date, the figures are as follows: of the US$107.8 million needed to cover presidential and parliamentary elections as well as out-of-country registration and voting and security, US$66.1 million were pledged in Berlin and only $27.7 million has been secured so far. This creates a particularly serious problem for refugee voting, to which I will come back later.

The electoral law
Following lengthy debates within the Joint Electoral Management Body and the Cabinet, the Electoral Law has now been finalized. The main point in discussion has been the role of political parties during this transitional election. Because the creation of single-member constituencies for all 249 members of the future Lower House was not an option for the 2004 elections, the point of departure of the design of the electoral system has been the establishment of multi-member constituencies based on the boundaries of the current provinces. Some argued that in order to promote multi-party democracy, it was advisable to encourage existing political parties to serve as intermediaries between the voters and their representatives through a system of party lists. Others felt strongly that the electoral system should not rely on political parties - which still carry a largely negative image in public opinion - and should, on the contrary, promote a direct link between voters and their representatives in Parliament. The latter view prevailed and the current law places political party representatives and independent candidates on the same footing.

The system chosen - the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) - has the merit of being simple to explain and fairly simple to operate (it was used also used during the two Loya Jirga), but it also tends to spread the vote widely among candidates, leading therefore to a potentially very fragmented representation. In order to try and contain these disadvantages, some prerequisites to the nomination of candidates have been included in the law, which are meant to mitigate the problem of fragmentation. As to women representation, the electoral law ensures compliance with the constitutional requirement that, on average, two women per province will be elected to the Lower House by providing that the best performing women will automatically get the seats that the provincial quota requires.

Local elections and refugee participation
In February, it was agreed that elections to be held in September would include only the Presidential election and elections to the Lower House. Local elections - it was agreed - would take place in a staggered way over a period of 6 months and the full Upper House would be constituted soon after. This, it turns out, was a wise decision since the settlement of disputes concerning district boundaries - a precondition for the organization of local elections - has not yet been completed and is likely to take quite some time.
I referred briefly to the issue of out-of-country registration and voting. It is hoped that a final decision will be made in the coming days and that operations can start without further delay.

But the challenges are quite considerable. Indeed, with the prospect of enabling more than 2 million refugees to vote, this is the largest out-of-country voting operation ever undertaken in a post-conflict context, and in circumstances that are far from easy. In Berlin, we had presented a bill for full registration and voting in Iran and Pakistan that amounted to US$37,6 million. Some donors were concerned about the high price, in particular if it should cover only presidential elections - which is the intention of the Cabinet. Together with the Afghan Electoral Commission, we have been working on other, less expensive options - including reducing registration to screening and holding it together with polling. However, these raise issues of credibility, particularly where the identification of eligible voters is difficult. Again, we hope that a solution that will meet electoral standards and provide franchise to the refugee population will be found soon. And will be funded even sooner.

Political parties
A few words now about key actors in the electoral process, namely political parties. The registration of political parties has been slow and difficult. This is, in part, because the Political Party Law sought, understandably, to limit the right to operate legally to those groups that were not related to military organizations. But this criteria has proved difficult to apply - let us remember that the main partners in the coalition government are or have been, in fact, heads of political/military organizations themselves. As of today, 16 parties have been registered out of 48 that have applied. And we continue to encourage donors to provide some capacity to these registered parties - on an equal basis - in order to enable them to participate meaningfully in the electoral process.

The political environment
The status of political parties takes us to the all-important issue of the overall environment in which the elections are to take place. You may remember that in August of last year, Ambassador Brahimi circulated to the Council a Draft Workplan that contained a series of security and political benchmarks that the country had to meet in order to hold an election that can genuinely lead to the "fully representative government" called for in the Bonn agreement. The political measures included, in particular, the adoption of a political party law and the registration of political parties; a revision of the existing Press Law to enhance the protection of journalists; and the creation of a Media Monitoring Commission; a Code of Conduct for political parties; the issuance by the central government of instructions to military and civilian officials concerning their duty of impartiality; and a campaign of verification of political rights jointly conducted by the Afghan Human Rights Commission and UNAMA.

These measures are at various stages of implementation. As mentioned before, a new political party law has been adopted and registration of political parties is ongoing, albeit too slowly. A new Media Law has been passed. While it has some shortcomings, the general assessment is that it contains a number of positive features and constitutes a clear improvement over the 1992 Press Law. Following the adoption of the Electoral Law, the electoral authorities are now establishing the Media Monitoring Commission, which, under the new legislation, will have to begin to operate no later than 60 days before the elections. A Code of Conduct has also been approved by the electoral authorities and is open to the signature of political parties and later independent candidates.

The Interior Minister has now issued a comprehensive set of instructions to Governors, district administrators and chiefs of police concerning their duties during the electoral process. Finally, the organization of the campaign of verification of political rights is being discussed between the Afghan Human Rights Commission and UNAMA and we hope that it will start throughout the country in mid-June.

IV. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Among the benchmarks for the holding of free and fair elections, one stands out in the mind of an overwhelming majority of Afghans, namely disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The importance of DDR goes, of course, beyond the elections. It is a critical component of a larger process aimed at addressing one of the most dangerous legacies of the lengthy Afghan conflict, namely the continued existence of multiple armies, which jeopardize the building of a viable Afghan state and constitute a permanent threat to civil peace. But the significance of DDR for the shorter-term electoral process cannot be overestimated.

Indeed, Afghans irrespective of geographical origin and ethnic affiliation have reaffirmed in countless occasions since the Emergency Loya Jirga that gave birth to the Transitional Government that a genuine exercise in electoral choice could only take place if the grip of local militias on the political process was loosened. The principal goal of the 2004 elections, namely strengthening the legitimacy and authority of the next Afghan government and, more broadly the institutions of the Afghan state, would no doubt be compromised if public perception should prevail that the election was distorted by military intimidation and interference.

This is why UNAMA has been insisting that DDR, while negotiable, is not optional but both a central and urgent task of the Transitional Government. Naturally, it is also a very complex and sensitive task. Coercive disarmament is not an option. Even if the central government had the will to conduct compulsory demobilization, it does not have the means to match. The process of disarmament is, therefore, unavoidably, a voluntary process. It requires a combination of factors that include a measure of overall confidence in the institutions of the state, particularly in the Ministry of Defence; confidence of soldiers and commanders in the sustainability of reintegration; and confidence of factional leaders in their security and their integration in the political future of the country.

As you are aware, following the completion of the pilot projects from December 2003 to February 2004 - which led to the demobilization of about 6000 soldiers and officers -, the Government and the international community reached an understanding on the main phase of DDR. It included the disarmament by June of 40% of the militia forces and, by July, the full cantonment of heavy weapons under a reliable safekeeping arrangement. However, the implementation of this agreement, strongly endorsed at the Berlin Conference, has suffered serious delays. Senior commanders have been reluctant to cooperate with the process on a variety of grounds. They have cited lack of balance of the DDR program between rival armed formations; Taliban operations in the South; and lack of confidence in the prospect for reintegration, including political integration.

Some of these concerns can be entertained and have been addressed through adjustments to the plan. In particular, as the list of soldiers in the various Army Corps were prepared and verified, it turned out that the initial troop strength officially announced by the Ministry of Defence a year ago was vastly overstated in several cases. As a result, a 40% reduction of the initial figure of 100,000 would have been tantamount to the unintended total demobilization of several military formations. With regard to political integration, discussions have been taking place on and off for many months.

We hope that an understanding can now materialize; and, as importantly, that this understanding will advance the main priorities on Afghanistan's national agenda: disarmament, the strengthening of national institutions, the rule of law, the observance of human rights, and the all-important fight against drugs.

In recent days, several commanders, including the commanders of the II, VI and VII Corps have announced that they would cooperate with the process and join the commanders of other Army Corps in handing over the lists of their soldiers and officers for verification and subsequent disarmament. This is good news, but time is running short, and suspicion running high in public opinion that delaying tactics are at work, which would allow military factors to play a role in the upcoming elections. It is important, therefore, that the process should pick up pace and translate into disarmament throughout the country without further delay. Broad popular confidence in the integrity of the electoral process is at that price.

Without waiting for the full lists to be submitted, the main phase has started in Kabul on 17 May, and disarmament operations began yesterday in Qunduz, Gardez and Kandahar.
As to Heavy Weapons cantonment, the countrywide survey is nearly complete. So far about 3,000 functioning or repairable weapon systems were surveyed. A second survey of the Panjshir valley is required, as it is believed that additional weapon systems are concentrated there. Heavy weapons cantonment is about to start in Gardez and in Kandahar and will take around a month to complete in each location. As the heavy weapons cantonment project is currently constrained by the limited capacity in Afghanistan to lift weapons systems, options are being explored to hire the necessary equipment from neighbouring countries. In Kabul, where heavy weapons cantonment started last November, ISAF hopes that full cantonment will be achieved in one week to 10 days.

V. Institution-building

While much attention is naturally focused on the short-term requirements of the holding of national elections and DDR, we have stressed repeatedly that neither the government nor the international community can afford to take their eyes off other fundamental tasks of the transition, namely the re-building of state institutions and the tools of governance. Beyond the elections themselves, it is indeed important that the upcoming elected government and parliament should have the institutional means to exercise their authority. In the eyes of the public, the legitimacy of the next government will be short-lived if it should prove powerless to assert its authority in terms of enforcing law and order and protecting basic human rights. In this context, let me provide you with a short progress report on efforts in this area:
New Afghan Army

The Afghan National Army is now almost 10,000 strong and, as mentioned earlier, it has demonstrated its potential for extending the authority of the central government in recent deployments to Heart in the west and Maimana in the northwest, following bouts of fighting. The training of officers and soldiers for the ANA has been accelerated after the building of further capacity at the military training centre in Kabul and a total of 1,800 additional troops are now undergoing training. It is planned that this acceleration in training will be sustained. The ANA will also in the next few months start to establish permanent bases in cities outside Kabul, the first of these being in Kandahar. That expansion is an important development for the country's stabilization.

New Afghan Police
The number of trained national police has also grown rapidly in parallel with the accelerated building of the ANA. Five out of a total of seven regional training centres are now operating and some 12,500 policemen have been trained. In addition, a further 1,500 police have graduated from the national police academy. These police officers and men are a vital resource. However, there is a real danger that their potential will not be fulfilled should they and more than thirty-five thousand other police officers and men due to be trained by the end of 2005 are not given adequate support and mentoring on the ground. Such support is yet another reason to stress the importance of the deployment of international security forces far and wide as a platform for the consolidation of police forces.

In this context, let me mention the fact that on 18 - 19 May representatives from 26 countries met in Doha at the invitation of the Afghan, German, Qatari governments and the United Nations to discuss the prospect for further regional cooperation in security and more specifically in support for the Afghan police. They agreed on the strategic importance for stability in the region of strengthening the capability of the Afghan police force in all areas of law enforcement. It was confirmed that US$350 million in international resources will be earmarked for police programmes. A follow-up conference is due to take place in November of this year.

VI. Conclusion

There is no doubt about the positive impact that the holding of genuine national elections can have on the consolidation of peace in Afghanistan. This election can be an invaluable means to a critical end, namely that of broadening the legitimacy of the new state and strengthening its authority to address the persisting problems of violent extremism, factionalism, drugs and what is still a very somber picture in terms of human rights. Surprisingly perhaps, in a country without a strong electoral tradition, voter registration has mobilized the population at large, who is insistently demanding participation in the electoral process. This should allay the concerns of those who may fear that these elections have no popular underpinning.

There is momentum. There are expectations. Those - not a small number - who were disappointed after the June 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga by the composition of the Transitional Government - deemed too unrepresentative of the nation -, have transferred their hopes to the national elections.
But this momentum and these expectations also place a considerable burden of the electoral process and the environment in which it takes place.

A process perceived to be biased and distorted could deeply undermine the hopes, which were enhanced by the adoption of the new Constitution, that differences among Afghans can be settled through peaceful political means. Let us not make any mistake in this regard: the requirements of freedom and fairness are not a foreign standard. They are deeply a pre-requisite for the holding of an election that will further peace, stability and national reconciliation in Afghanistan. Much of the responsibility for providing such an environment rests with the Afghan themselves.

In particular, those Afghan leaders who aspire to the authority that stems from a national election must know that the anticipated legitimacy of its outcome is predicated upon the legitimacy of the process itself. But the burden also rests on the international community. And let me conclude, as I started, with the issue of security; and take advantage of this opportunity - perhaps the last one - to call upon the member states of NATO to respond to the appeal of their Secretary-General and allow the Organization to meet the commitments it has given earlier to the people of Afghanistan.

Security in general, and that of the electoral process in particular, is ultimately an Afghan responsibility, but it is a responsibility that Afghans cannot shoulder without international assistance. Training, funding and general capacity-building are important tools, but there are not enough. Widespread, robust international military presence in support of domestic security forces remains critical. The persistent woes of Afghanistan - terrorism, factionalism and criminal networks - are as much at work today as they were two years ago and their ability to subvert state-building and a genuine political process is hardly diminished. Whether it is counter-terrorism, electoral security, counter-narcotics or control of factional fighting, at this critical juncture for the Afghan peace process, international security assistance continues to make the difference between success and failure

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