I. Introduction

Mr. President,

1. It is an honour to address the Council one more time, the last, I think, on Afghanistan. And I am particularly pleased to do so under your Presidency, Your Excellency Ambassador Muñoz. It was a privilege to receive you in Kabul last fall and I would like to thank you again for your interest and support. Allow me, to also thank all your colleagues, the members of the Council who, soon after your own visit, made a truly historic fact-finding trip to Afghanistan, under the able and energetic leadership of Ambassador Pleuger.

2. As a result of the extensive meetings you all had then, in Kabul, in Mazar-e-Sharif, in Herat, there is not much I can tell you today that you do not already know. In addition, the Council has before it the Secretary-General’s report, which describes in some detail recent developments of note, and there is no need, therefore, to cover in my remarks all aspects of UNAMA’s mandate. This report, however was completed before the end of the Constitutional Loya Jirga, and I propose, if I may, to use this opportunity to brief the Council on this Loya Jirga, and then to discuss in broad terms the state of the peace process in Afghanistan – what has been achieved and what has not, the challenges ahead and where, in my view, the Afghan authorities and the international community will need to focus their efforts if our shared goals are to be achieved.

3. The transitional political process of the Bonn Agreement contains a number of elements, but at its heart, it is a plan to restore peace and stability to Afghanistan by reforming, strengthening and where necessary, rebuilding the institutions of state. The success we may ascribe to it after two years, and indeed in the final analysis, will depend upon how far Afghanistan has managed to establish viable, accountable and representative state institutions that can ensure security for the people and establish a credible base for the development of the country.

II. Accomplishments of the Bonn process thus far

4. The Bonn process has certainly accomplished a great deal since December 2001. I will mention only some of the most important ones here. Large scale conflict has not returned, a humanitarian crisis was averted early on, and the political timetable has for the most part been kept: from the installation of the Interim Authority on 22 December 2001, through the holding of the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002, the formation of President Karzai’s transitional administration and now the successful conclusion of the Constitutional Loya Jirga.

5. Under President Karzai’s leadership, the Afghan administration has overseen some worthy accomplishments, including the articulation of a National Development Framework and the National Budget, the adoption of a new national currency, the first steps in the formation of a National Army and a National Police, and the return to school of some 4 million boys and girls. During the same period the Independent Human Rights Commission established itself throughout the country and the groundwork was laid for a number of key national reconstruction and development programmes. Some of these are beginning to reap benefits for the country, such as the road reconstruction programme, the restoration of the power grid, increased agricultural activity, the National Solidarity Programme and the National Emergency Employment Programme.

III. Constitutional Loya Jirga

6. A further step in the Bonn transitional plan was achieved on 4 January 2004 with near unanimous acclamation of the new Constitution. Of the 502 delegates to the Constitutional Loya Jirga, 52 were appointed by the President and 450 were elected by the district representatives who had themselves been elected prior to the Emergency Loya Jirga in 2002. These district representatives, some 15,000 of them, were re-registered, and served as the electorate that voted for the Constitutional Loya Jirga delegates. All in all, their turnout reflected a determination to participate, but there were clear signs that insecurity, and disaffection in the South, took their toll as well. The average national registration was 82 percent, though this varied from provincial highs of 96% in Khost and Samangan to levels of 59% and 61% in Zabul and Kandahar respectively. The Constitutional Loya Jirga was to a large degree representative of Afghanistan taken as a whole, and included delegates from every province, and from communities such as the Kuchis, Hindu and Sikhs, refugees, IDPs, and the disabled as well as other minority groups. Women’s political participation increased with women delegates comprising approximately 20 per cent of the Constitutional Loya Jirga.

7. To the best of our knowledge, there was no widespread pattern of intimidation or fraud, and individual cases and complaints were investigated by an Executive Committee that overturned electoral results in a number of cases where wrongdoing was found. I am not saying that the process was flawless. This was an exercise that took place in an insecure environment; security conditions had deteriorated since the Emergency Loya Jirga and extremists had repeatedly threatened to disrupt the process. Furthermore, with insufficient security sector reform and practically no disarmament, factional leaders were left with leverage in the political contest.

8. The elections also showed a resurgence of some of the factional groupings, with stronger showings than for the Emergency Loya Jirga. This has potential consequences for the forthcoming legislative elections. Jihadi parties organized themselves well in the Northeast, Jumbish, (a mainly Uzbek organization) took the lead in forming a block of votes from the North, while in Badghis and Herat the majority were Jamiat, (the mainly Tajik party) and Ismael Khan supporters.

9. Much of the Constitutional Loya Jirga unfolded before the country on live radio and TV broadcasts, providing a type of public debate not seen in the country for many years. The Loya Jirga reached early consensus on some 120 of the 160 articles of the draft constitution, but it saw difficult debate and hard bargaining on a number of issues. Many of these were issues one would expect to be contentious in any constitutional process: the form of government, central vs. regional and provisional authority, the role of the courts in constitutional review and their relative power vs. the executive and parliament. Other issues were particular to the current Afghan context and were related to local and national identity, including various issues related to language.

10. There were somewhat worrying but not unexpected signs of polarization along ethnic lines. The Pahstun contingent represented a majority in the Loya Jirga and was particularly intent on redressing some of the perceived political disenfranchisement over the last two years. Their unity of purpose may well influence the remaining stages of the political transition. On other issues there were complaints that Jihadi leaders used domineering tactics to push for their own agenda, but not with much success. As the Loya Jirga extended beyond its originally planned ten days into a third week, there were real concerns that agreement might not be reached.

11. In the end, the delegates proved willing to reach compromises and make concessions in order to arrive at a text that all could accept. And the Constitution they ratified reflects this balancing of concerns. For example the strong Presidential system has been revised to give the National Assembly greater oversight over Presidential appointments. Also, although Pashto is the language of the national anthem, the Constitution recognizes minority languages as official in the areas where they are the language of the local majority. This Constitution requires adherence to international instruments, and mandates the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission to protect and promote human rights. Significantly, the political participation of women is greatly enhanced by this Constitution. At least 25 per cent of the seats of the lower house of parliament are reserved for women.

12. I believe that the new constitution, and the process that achieved it, should be a source of pride for the people of Afghanistan. They have proved that despite the adversity they continue to face, a peaceful constitution making process could be achieved. The fundamental law they have newly written should, if implemented, provide a solid foundation upon which to continue the task of addressing the real needs that face Afghans on a daily basis.

13. Mr. President, there is so much to be done that unfortunately, Afghans and their international partners cannot afford to rest long on the laurels of a successful Constitutional Loya Jirga. From the Loya Jirga itself a number of major tasks immediately present themselves.

IV. Post Loya Jirga challenges

14. First, is the task of implementing the constitution, to give life to it. At the closing ceremony of the Loya Jirga I made the point that President Karzai, his government and all Afghans will now have the challenge of making of the Constitution they adopted a living reality. This is of course the challenge of any constitutional order. However in Afghanistan, where state institutions remain weak, the capacity of the government to fulfill the promises of the new constitution requires a lot of hard work from the Afghans themselves and sustained international assistance. This is all the more pressing because the debate at the Loya Jirga has raised the expectations of Afghans that their government and its international partners will now deliver on their promise of peace and stability.

15. The fact that Afghans reached agreement on the new Constitution is a great accomplishment but ultimately, the test of each element of the Bonn process will be whether or not Afghanistan is moved forward, towards what I have referred to previously before the Council as the “irreversibility” of peace. From this perspective, the new constitutional order will only have meaning for the average Afghan if security improves and the rule of law is strengthened. And for too many Afghans, the daily insecurity they face comes not from resurgent extremism associated with the Taliban, destabilizing as that is, but from the predatory behaviour of local commanders and officials who nominally claim to represent the government.

16. Thus, if expectations have been raised, they are likely to focus on the needs that have been there since the start of the peace process and remain unmet: the disarmament of factional forces, the protection of the basic rights of every Afghan citizen, the demand for increased reconstruction, the reform of national institutions so that they are more professional and more representative, and reform, also, across the government to ensure all Afghans feel that it better represents them.

17. These are the first major challenges in implementing the constitution because they remain the challenges of the peace process. Addressing them will also create the conditions for the success of the national electoral exercises, the legislative drafting processes, and the other tasks that are more directly called for in the implementation of the constitution.

V. Security sector reform

18. The programmes that make up the Security Sector Reform initiative for Afghanistan are well known to this Council, Mr. President, and they are updated in the report of the Secretary-General. Over the past two years of the Bonn process, the creation of a capable, unified and loyal national army and police has certainly shown progress with the able and committed assistance of the United States and France on the army building side, and Germany and the United States for the police. But I am sure these partners will not disagree that, two years into the Bonn process, we are not as far as we should be for the central government to assert its authority. Further gains could certainly be made if the effort to reform the national security institutions, the Ministries of Defence, Interior and the intelligence services were to pick up pace, as this too has been slower than required, in large measure because of limited cooperation in key parts of the government.

19. The appointment of a new top cadre of 22 Ministry of Defense officials, welcome as it was, is not enough reform to show for two years of trying. I believe the Afghan people expect more, and so should the international community. As we have discussed before, the security institutions will need to be seen as truly national, rather than factionally dominated, if the national army, police and intelligence are to replace the factionalised forces that continue to dominate the landscape. Disbanding the factional structures will depend on successful DDR, and thus the disarmament and demobilization of the factions and the building of a national army and police are really part and parcel of the same effort.

20. Now, Mr. President, I am afraid that the DDR programme has also not progressed far enough and this too, is due in large measure to insufficient cooperation from key partners. There can only be two ways to conduct a DDR programme. Involuntary disarmament may be contemplated if one has at one’s disposal the forces necessary to compel cooperation. Voluntary disarmament, such as we are pursuing, requires fully cooperative partners. And so far, cooperation has been measured, at best. With the experience of the pilot DDR projects in Kunduz, Gardez, Mazaar and Kabul to draw upon, UNAMA will be reviewing the DDR programme, with its government and international partners to see whether improvements might be made, and acceleration of the process achieved. It will be necessary to look at an increased incentive structure for mid and senior level commanders, but I fear that without better cooperation from the faction leaders – who are in fact government officials – the problem of factionalised armed units will continue to bedevil the peace process.

VI. Security in the South, East and Southeast

21. Having said that, the threat factional forces pose to the peace process has been increasingly compounded by the terrorist tactics of extremists aimed at causing the peace process to fail all together. The pattern continues of challenging the central government’s authority and disrupting the peace process by attacking targets of opportunity irrespective of their civilian status, be they Government, NGO, UN or ordinary citizens. In the period since I last briefed the Council, a number of serious attacks have occurred, including, last November, a car bomb attack on the UN compound in Kandahar and the tragic and revolting murder in Ghazni of Bettina Groislard, a UNHCR staff member. A bomb placed against the external wall of a UNAMA guesthouse in Kabul, mercifully made no victims. On 6 January another bomb in Kandahar aimed at Afghan militia forces killed and injured innocent children and civilians.

22. The recent attacks and threats must be taken to confirm that the UN, as such, is now a target in Afghanistan. They coincide with clear signals that extremist elements calling themselves Taliban or supporters of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar are reorganizing, issuing statements, and trying to rally support against the peace process. These attacks have constricted, for months now, the area of operations of the UN and the NGO community in the South, East and Southeast. This has the effect of blocking reconstruction and development activities, and limiting the presence of the government in the affected areas.

23. A number of measures have been taken in response. The UN Security Management Team has taken steps to minimize UN staff exposure to risk, including by increasing security measures at our compounds and reducing staff in high risk areas. UNAMA will require further funding for these and other protective measures.

24. President Karzai established two National Task Forces to improve the coordination of government ministries in providing short term protection measures and longer term responses to the threats, and at the regional level similar task forces have developed security plans which aim to address as well as possible, UN and NGO security requirements. Dedicated police deployments are planned to protect UN and international compounds in the South. The coalition, ISAF and concerned member states have also increased information sharing with UNAMA, and I must stress that this is a critical requirement if UN Staff in Afghanistan are to make informed and reasonable decisions regarding risks.

25. The costly and intensive efforts to interdict extremist elements at the border by the United States and Pakistan deserve recognition. At the same time, Mr. President, there are all these press reports, generally in the Pakistani press itself, relayed by the media worldwide about “infilliation of terrorists” from Pakistan and other reports claiming that Taliban leaders are moving freely in and between cities in Pakistan. It is encouraging that Pakistani and Afghan authorities are now discussing these issues of concern in a positive and constructive manner. I believe it is vital that the two countries continue to cooperate and take all possible measures to address this situation. The strong bonds of history, religion, and culture which unite Afghanistan and Pakistan are well known. Officials and common people alike, in both countries are well aware that conflict and strife in one country will unfailingly and directly affect the other. The growing cooperation between the two countries against terrorists, criminals and other spoilers disserves to be recognized, encouraged and strongly supported.

26. I should also note here that in my view, much more can and should be done by the government of Afghanistan to ensure that in the areas where the Taliban and other extremists are operating, they do not gain from dissatisfactions in the population. The Government, along with UNAMA, UN agencies and international security forces, is working out integrated packages to improve district level governance, strengthen the formal and traditional justice system, increase the presence of police, and reach out with focused reconstruction assistance to communities. These so-called “provincial strategies” will focus first on areas in the South and elsewhere suffering insecurity, poor governance, marginalization for geographical or political reasons, and a sense of isolation. There is also more that the Government may do to reach out to those individuals and groups that have not been part of the process so far but are not responsible for criminal activity and are willing to participate peacefully in the rebuilding of their country.

VII. Implications for the electoral process

27. As the Secretary-General makes clear in his report, the deterioration in security continues at precisely the time when the peace process requires the government and the UN to broaden their presence in the field to complete the electoral registration and other activities such as the census and ongoing reconstruction programmes. As the report further points out, throughout the constitutional process the threat was mitigated by limiting exposure, by not holding new district level elections and concentrating activities in urban centres, protected by available security resources. Recent attacks in urban areas are challenging that approach for the registration of voters. Naturally, the national electoral registration and, later, polling exercises cannot be conducted from behind a hardened compound wall. Electoral teams must go to the voters, and each eligible and willing voter must be served directly at the village level.

28. UNAMA and the Interim Electoral Commission are planning to absorb into the Afghan Electoral Commission’s Secretariat staff from the Constitutional Secretariat. They may be better able to travel and work locally than international staff. However, if the process itself is targeted, then, I am afraid that Afghan nationality may not be a source of protection. Furthermore, a successful electoral exercise will require more than security for electoral staff – it will require an environment that allows for a fair political contest. The prominence at the loya jirga of leaders who continue to wield personal control over factional forces raises serious concerns in this regard, and reminds us once again of the need for accelerated security sector reform, DDR, and increased international security assistance.

VII. ISAF expansion

29. Mr. President, it is too early to draw lessons from the first two years of the Bonn process, but I firmly believe that one clear lesson relates to the difficulty of carrying out post-conflict transitional processes without commensurate, dedicated security assistance. Until Afghan security institutions are further built up, there will be a need in other parts of the country for the sort of assistance that ISAF has so ably given in Kabul. UNAMA, along with almost all Afghans, received with great anticipation the news of the resolution by this Council enabling the expansion of ISAF. The recent launch of the German PRT in Kunduz is a welcome sign that some form of expansion is beginning in earnest. My colleagues and I at UNAMA have met with NATO planners on the ground, and look forward to the creation of more ISAF-led PRTs. Also welcome is the intention of the US to create a broader PRT presence in the South. The PRT concept has proven to be of value, particularly where they have focused their activities on improving security conditions. While I continue to believe that the PRT’s are a “second-best” to a straightforward expansion of ISAF’s peacekeeping functions, I do hope that they will be given the resources and the mandate to help accelerate security sector reform, participate in Government’s and UNAMA’s efforts to manage and defuse local tensions, and more generally help coordinate security support to the Bonn process; all the more if there were some capacity for ISAF to conduct forward deployments of more robust forces when and where necessary, as I understand is being considered.

30. It is cause for concern however, that the pace of PRT deployment is running behind that of the political process. The Presidential elections will require improved security, and the legislative elections even more so. As the Secretary-General notes, it might be possible to hold Presidential elections with a few areas of the country remaining “off limits”, though this has its risks. Doing so with legislative elections, however, would mean disenfranchising people along ethnic lines and that would not be tenable. I would therefore urge the members of NATO, and other troop contributing countries to ISAF, to take all measures possible to provide ISAF with the resources necessary to expand sooner, rather than later.

VIII. Drugs

31. Mr. President, I have taken quite a bit of the Council’s time, but if you would allow me I should like to shift from the political programme that lies ahead to say a few words about the problem of narcotics production because the drug trade continues to be one of the biggest threats to Afghanistan's long-term peace and stability. It presently supports the criminal and factional agendas that aim to undermine the central government and other legitimate economic activities, and there are reports that income from the drug trade is also funding the activities of all sorts of extremists and spoilers.

32. One of the most worrying aspects of the drug trade is how much the Afghan economy, and therefore the population, depends on it. The 2003 Opium Poppy Survey conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that the income of opium farmers and drug traffickers in 2003 - an estimated total of over $2.3 billion - was equivalent to more than 50% of the country's GDP. It was estimated that in 2003, 1.7 million people - representing approximately 7% of the population - were involved in the farming of opium poppy. In 2003, opium poppy was grown in 28 out of 32 provinces. These statistics are all the more alarming when it is considered that, according to the preliminary results of the UNODC farmers' intentions survey conducted in the latter half of 2003, farmers are intent on growing opium poppy again in 2004, and with greater intensity.

33. The central government has shown a commitment to tackling the problem. To date, efforts have concentrated on building the capacity of government institutions such as the Counter Narcotics Directorate and the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and on the drafting of legislation. While these activities are essential in the long term fight against drugs, they have not had an immediate effect on the amount of opium, cultivated or trafficked.

34. Stronger measures need to be taken to have an effect in the short term Eradication programs in the past have had mixed results partly because the implementation of those programs has been the responsibility of provincial and often corrupt authorities. Eradication would be better undertaken by a national eradication force - something which the central Government is presently considering. Drug interdiction campaigns will also have to be intensified. This responsibility is shared by all authorities involved in law enforcement - including the Counter Narcotics Police, the Border Police and all military forces in the country.

35. However, as is recognized by the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy, the problem will not be solved in the long term without development and achievements being made in other sectors, including in providing alternative livelihoods, in building up the judicial and penal system, and in reducing demand for opium derivatives both inside Afghanistan and abroad. The Government, the United Kingdom as lead nation, and UNODC are working together and with others to meet these formidable challenges.

IX. The path ahead

36. Mr. President, at the outset I said that Afghanistan had achieved much in the past two years. However, as I think I have said before to this Council, those achievements also mean there is now even more to lose and more to protect. The Afghans, and their international partners, including this Council, will have to chart the way forward carefully. The success of the Constitutional Loya Jirga and the political debate that began does offer hope, but it is a success that must be quickly capitalized on, lest it does no more than raise false expectations.

37. And I believe the key challenges that must quickly be addressed remain the same today, after the Loya Jirga, as they were described in the Secretary-General’s report before the Loya Jirga: broadening the popular base of the Government and strengthening a governance system based on the rule of law, improving security, and increasing the pace of reconstruction and service delivery.

38. There are many indications that in these three areas, not enough progress is being made and some of the gaps may even have widened over the past year. On the security front, those indications are many and they have been often detailed to this Council. Concerning the base of popular support for the government, there were clear indications at the Loya Jirga for example of the disaffection among Pashtuns at not receiving a fair degree of representation in the government. On the reconstruction front, the assistance in the South, the East and Southeast is slowing due to insecurity. In the economic field more generally, the Minister of Finance has noted that the hurried estimates done for the 2001 Tokyo conference at the height of the crisis need to be revisited, and he is conducting a re-costing exercise to determine the actual investment needs in order to reach basic financial sustainability and avert the domination of the national economy by the narcotics industry.

39. Mr. President, following its visit to Afghanistan in early November, the Council recommended that the Secretary-General explore ways of giving a new impetus to the Bonn process. His report discusses some of the possibilities and he again alluded to them in his statement a moment ago. UNAMA circulated in Kabul a non-paper on the subject to the Government and the Diplomatic Corps. The paper noted that a second conference was one possible way to re-energise the commitment of all concerned to address the three gaps in the peace process that I have mentioned. Some interlocutors observed that there may be other means to address those gaps, and that a large conference is perhaps not necessary. What is important, however and I personally believe urgent, is that some means are identified in order to improve and accelerate the performance of the Government and its international partners in implementing the Bonn process, lest these gaps undermine the progress that has been made.

40. Mr. President, as I come near the end of my briefing, I would like to thank the Council once again for the remarkable support that it has shown for Afghanistan. The coherent and sustained support of this Council, and the generosity and close collaboration of the wider international community have been essential to the progress made.

41. Furthermore, I cannot conclude today’s briefing, Mr. President, without a few words about the people I left behind in Afghanistan. First an expression of profound gratitude, respect and admiration to President Hamed Karzai. It was a privilege to know and work with such an Afghan patriot, dedicated to his country and people, modest, honest, and selfless. I cannot thank him enough for the frank, open, and close cooperation I have consistently enjoyed from him. And I would like to wish him, from here, once again, success in his noble mission.

42. My thanks, also, to the members of President’s Karzai’s Government for their cooperation, and for their patience. Many have become close friends and I wish them well. It is important to me, also, Mr. President, to salute, from here, the people of Afghanistan. I am proud and I believe that the Council and the UN at large can be proud too of the confidence the United Nations enjoys with the overwhelming majority of the Afghan people. The other day, at a moment which was particularly tense and difficult at the Loya Jirga, a delegate got to the rostrum and said that they, the delegates had full confidence in UNAMA. It was humbling to all of us and we are grateful to the people of Afghanistan for the warmth of their feelings towards this Organization and the men and women – Afghans and non Afghan – who are working for the UN over there.

43. It is also a pleasant duty to say a word about those colleagues and friends in UNAMA and the rest of the UN Country team in Afghanistan. Speaking the other day in Kabul, I said that the secret of whatever success I was fortunate to achieve in Afghanistan was that I had a team of particularly talented and dedicated colleagues. I just looked at them work and took the credit for their achievements. To all of them, I will simply say, thank you, my very dear friends and colleagues and may God protect you as you continue the good work you are doing in Afghanistan. I would like to recognize, too, our colleagues here in Headquarters, the Deputy Secretary-General, the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, DPKO, DPA and all other departments, as well as in the other parts of the United Nations, the agencies, the Funds and Programmes for the unfailing support we received from all of them.

44. Last but not least, Mr. President, may I say how deeply indebted
I feel to the Secretary-General. Throughout these long months, first in New York when we were preparing the Bonn Conference, then in Bonn and later in Kabul, he was always there for us, ever supportive and protective, always encouraging us along and reassuring us in moments of doubt. I thank him most sincerely and look forward to continue to serve this Organization under his inspiring leadership.

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