Mr. President,

As the focus of this meeting is the status of security sector reform in Afghanistan, I will update the Council on general developments since the last briefing, and then provide an overview of security sector refom1 from UNAMA's perspective. I will limit my comments on security sector reform to the 1nterrelationships between the various activities, and leave the discussion of each sector to the relevant lead nations.

Just this morning we received reports of a plane crash near Karachi in which the Afghan Minister for Mines and Industries, Juma Mohammad Mohammadi, reportedly died, along with a Pak1stani foreign Minister official, Mohammad Farhad Ahmed and other Afghan and Pakistan colleagues. I would like to express my sincere condolences to the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan for this loss.

Returning to the subject of this meeting, witl1 respect to the implementation of the political transition outlined by the Bonn Agreement, the important process of drafting a new Constitution has advanced. President Karzai’s office is preparing a decree that will establish the Constitutional Commission and detail the main elements of the constitutional process. The decree will provide clarity on the overall process as well as signal the Government's strong political endorsement of it. The nine members of the currently functioning Constitutional Drafting Committee will be made part of the larger Constitutional Commission, which is expected to be established in early March. President Karzai's office has compiled a list of eighty candidates for possible selection to the Commission.

An important part of the Constitutional process will be the series of public consultations between April and June that will solicit the views of Afghans on the future political shape of their country. These consultations will take place in every province of Afghanistan, as well as among the diaspora in Iran and Pakistan, and possibly in other countries where the diaspora is heavily represented. The results of these consultations will be important guides for the Constitutional Commission in its work.

Technical assistance from UNAMA, UNDP, bi-lateral donors and academic sources has been made available to the drafting committee and its secretariat. These resources will also be available to the full Commission. While substantive international expert advice will be a useful resource, we believe it is critical for the process to remain Afghan-led, and for Afghans to decide among themselves, using the tools of dialogue and compromise, the more politically contentious issues.

I am also pleased to report progress in preparations for the June 2004 elections. On February 15th, President Karzai sent the Secretary-General a letter formally requesting UNAMA 's assistance in organizing tl1e electoral process and coordinating international electoral assistance. A few days ago, the head of UNAMA's electoral section arrived in Kabul and has started work. A core team of electoral experts, the first of whom has already arrived, is in the process of being deployed to UNAl\1A. On the Afghan side, President Karzai has identified a number of candidates for membership in the electoral commission> which we expect to be formed in March. Once the commission is established, it will work with UNAMA's team to create the Afghan electoral authority, which in turn will manage the electoral process. An electoral unit is also being set up in the Ministry of the Interior.

Mr. President,

The Government is now engaged in a rigorous process of finalizing its budget for tl1e next Afghan financial year, which begins on March 21st. Ministries are preparing proposals in consultation with the newly-formed sector Consultative Groups, which bring together government actors and the assistance community in a coordinated framework. This process is an important test of the Government's inter-ministerial and Cabinet policy-making systems. The proposals will be subjected to an intens1ve cabinet review and finalized so that they can be presented to the Afghanistan Development Forum, which begins on March l3th in Kabul. In order to sustain the still- fragile Afghan peace process, I would urge all donors to participate in the Development Forum with the same generous spirit that was demonstrated at the Afghanistan Support Group in Oslo last December.
Afghans are optimistic that the international community will fulfill the; commitments it has already made for 2003. The Government looks forward to the provision of between $1.7 and $2 billion in aid this year. This optimism is, however, tempered by concerns about the slow pace of allocations. There is also a fear that, as donors monitor the current international situation they may withhold funds for possible use elsewhere. As a result, these agencies are concerned that they might not be able to meet their existing assistance commitments to Afghanistan.

Mr. President,

The Human Rights situation in Afghanistan continues to be undermined by the poor overall security environment. In the absence of effective state institutions, many Afghans are subjected to arbitrary rule by local commanders and have no recourse to legitimate judicial institutions. UNAMA human rights officers continue to hear of cases of extra-judiciary executions, extortions, and forced displacements.

UNAMA is maintaining its efforts to build the capacity of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and to engage with local authorities to prevent abuses. Satellite offices of the Commission are in the process of being opened in Bamyan, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. With assistance from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Afghan Human Rights Commission has begun to prioritize the more than 600 complaints that have been lodged with it. This exercise will help the Commission to decide the most pressing cases to investigate, while ensuring that its resources are used as effectively as possible and that positive results are demonstrated.

Mr. President,

Turning to the main theme of today's meeting, I would like to preface my comments on security sector reform by describing some recent and worrying security trends in Afghanistan. These trends highlight the imperative to both quicken the pace of security sector reform and to consider immediate measures to improve security. Hopefully, these issues too will factor into our discussion today.

While the Bonn process has so far successfully averted full-scale fighting between major rival factions, Afghans continue to suffer on a human level from the insec1.lrity created by the conjunction of weak national security institutions and strong local commanders.

Council Members will recall when Mr. Brahimi briefed this Council less than a month ago that an improvised mine exploded on a roadside near Kandahar that same day, killing twelve bus passengers. Since then, several other incidents have occurred in Kandahar. On February l2th, a grenade exploded outside the UNHCR office. This is the second grenade attack on UN premises in Kandahar in the last several months. Fortunately there were no injuries in either case. On January 29th, an explosive device detonated in the compound of the NGO Action Against Hunger, thankfully causing no injuries.

A week ago, in the northeastern city of Kunduz, a grenade was thrown over the wall of the compound belonging to the International Organization of Migration. The blast blew out windows ill the building but luckily there were no casualties. An hour later, a second explosion occurred in the center of Kunduz.

In eastern Afghanistan, the government's poppy-eradication campaign continues to face strong opposition from local tribes who do not feel they have been offered sufficient compensation. U"N activities have been suspended in four districts in Nargarhar as a result of this tension.

UNAMA has also recently received credible threats of the kidnapping of internationals in Kabul, Jalalabad and Kunar provinces. Enhanced security measures were implemented as a result. We ren1ain, however, worried about increasing tl1reats and actions against international assistance agencies. Purely as a contingency, UNAMA has discussed with UN agencies and some foreign missions the response that should be taken if the security situation deteriorates to the point that international operations become unsafe in any given area. In light of the political importance of the international presence to the peace process, there is a common understanding that the overall approach will be to analyze security incidents on a case-by-case basis, and conduct any potential withdrawal primarily to other locations in Afghanistan, while continuing operations in all other areas as long as this is feasible and safe. Caution and prudence will guide our actions, but never panic. I must stress that this is simply contingency planning and there is, at present, no sense among key actors in AfghanistaJ1 that there is aJ1y area that has, or is likely to, reach a state where withdrawal would be required.

Despite a general sense of concern about security conditions across the country, 1 am pleased to note the smooth handover of ISAF command from Turkey to Germany and the Netherlands on February lOth. I would like to thank Turkey for the leadership provided over the past seven months by General Hilmi Akin Zorlu and lli5 staff, as well as for the professionalism and dedication that has been, and continues to be, demonstrated by the officers and soldiers of the twenty-two member states that contribute to ISAF. I thank also, Mr. President, your Government and that of the Netherlands for assuming joint command under General Norbert Van Heyest.

Mr. President,

The challenges of reforming the Afghan security sector are significant: the national army needs to be built, factional armies need to be dissolved, and assistance needs to be provided to help ex-combatants reintegrate into civilian life. A nalio1Jal police force needs to be created, the rule of law re-established, the justice sector rehabilitated, and the cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs countered. Finally, the bloated and intrusive internal intelligence structures must be reformed so that they no longer inspire fear among the people that they are expected to protect.

Security sector reform is made all the more urgent by the complex political activities planned for the next sixteen months. The security sector must be able to provide minimal conditions of stability to ensure that the Constitutional Loya Jirga and the national elections are meaningful and credible. Confirming this assessment, President Karzai has said that the reform of the security sector is his priority in the coming months.

Success will depend on a comprehensive, integrated approach that addresses the linkages between the security sub-sectors, and unites the efforts of international actors and Afghan leaders at every level. For example, the creation of the new army and police is linked to the successful reintegration into civilian life of the members of existing security forces. This will require political consensus at the local and national level, and international commitment to deliver the required assistance.

Success will also depend on creating fully representative institutions of central government. The upper echelons of tile Ministries of Defence and Interior must reflect the regional and political diversity of the country, and they must be seen to work together in the interests of national unity. Only this will build the necessary trust in the national character of t1le new security forces. The decision on February 2Oth to effect changes in 17 high-level positions in the Ministry of Defence is therefore a welcome development, and a strong signal of the Government's determination to create a truly national army.

The creation of the army, the phasing out of factional militias, and the effective demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants constitute the linchpin of security sector reform. If these processes succeed, implementing the others, and the Bonn Agreement in general, will be much easier. While we hope that strong signals and actions at the national. government level win help build confidence among various factions that must be disarmed. demobilized and reintegrated, it is also clear that the political support needed to complete the DDR process will probably have to be built, carefully and gradually, from region to region across the country. In terms of international support, a conference on DDR was just held in Tokyo on February 22nd, and I'm sure we'll hear more about that shortly.

As local militias are drawn down, a reforn1ed National Police will have to be created to provide the foundation of law and order across the country. The newly- appointed Interior Minister, His Excellency Ali Ahmad Jalali, has displayed a promising readiness to reform tile police. Efforts are also being intensified to support the Border Police, which has just been moved from the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of Interior. Norway and other Nordic countries have ~expressed an interest in pU5hing t1lis process forward. President Karzai and the Minister are also working on a draft decree to set the course of reform for the police and border guard. much as the first of December decree did for the army.

The Counter-narcotics effort, has been spurred recently by the Government's active poppy eradication campaign in the five core poppy producing provinces. As mentioned, this law enforcement effort has created some tensions, and will need to be accompanied by convincing alternative livelihoods programmes. We estimate that $20-40 million in various alterative livelihoods, infrastructure and employment generation projects should be available in the near to medium term. The magnitude of this problem is extremely well documented in a study on the opium economy released last month by UNODC. The study estimates that gross income from opium production at the farm level may have been as high as $1.2 billion in 2002. This is more than half of what the government expects in total international aid.

A11 of the activities within the rubric of security sector reform arc closely lil1ked to each other and to other critical political and economic developments under the BOM process. Success therefore requires a great deal of cooperation. and 1 am pleased at the way the lead nations for each sub-sector and UNAMA have coordinated their efforts in Kabul. But the resources needed to carry out security sector reform are greater than those that the designated lead nations can provide on their own. For that reason, I would like to re-emphasize that these countries are working to attract and coordinate the assistance of others in their respective sectors. I urge member states to provide the necessary financial and material support. The United Nations has established four trust funds for contributions to the police, the justice sector, DDR, and the payment of salaries and the provision of non-lethal equipment to the Afghan national army.

While the international community can and must provide support, in the end the success of the reform project depends on the Afghans themselves. In the months ahead, the political underpinnings of security sector reform must be strengthened by the deeds and words of the Transitional Administration. The police, the army, and the intelligence service are still viewed by too many Afghans as politically biased. The chances of successfully reforming the security sector will be much enhanced if the statements of Afghan authorities on national reconciliation are demonstrably upheld.

Mr. President,

I would like to thank you once again for focusing our attention on the important issue of security, in all its dimensions. I look forward to a fruitful discussion on this topic, which, in the end, underpins the entire Bonn process.

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