Introduction

Mr. President,

Distinguished Members of the Council,

1. When I last had the privilege of briefing this Council, just over three months ago, I tried to convey how security, or more to the point, the lack of security, was a challenge to the implementation of the Bonn Agreement at every turn. The need for improved security remains a fundamental concern.

2. The lack of security is of course symptomatic of the fact that large gaps continue to exist in the architecture of the state. The new national army and the national police are still far from the strength and capacity that will allow them to ensure security in Afghanistan. Nor are the ministries of interior and defense able yet to lay claim to being truly national ministries, commanding national institutions in which all Afghans can equally lay their trust.

3. Reforms are needed in those and all other government ministries, which remain influenced by factional and ethnic interests, so that they become the levers of the state - instruments of a national system of government.

4. The first steps of this reform must be in the ministries of de fence and interior as well as the intelligence services, precisely because these institutions can, if they are reformed and able to replace the factional structures that now exist, provide the base of stability upon which the rest of the other institutions of state can take hold.

5. With basic control over the state security institutions, the central government would then be more able to assert its authority nationwide; the rule of law can be re-established and public confidence renewed. That is why, in situations such as Afghanistan’s, one may say that the reform and rebuilding of the army and police can be considered the first development project.

6. As Afghanistan navigates the constitutional and electoral stages of the Bonn process that aim to achieve a new political order, it is ever more apparent that space must be created for the institutions of the State to take hold again. Afghans are being asked to participate in national political processes, but without the structures that make a state function, an elected government – supposing that goal can be achieved in a credible manner – will have little chance of upholding and implementing its constitutional obligations.

7. Therefore, as we press forward with the political phases of Bonn, it becomes ever more important to use the financial, political and security resources available from the international community to create some space for the fragile institutions of the state to be renewed.

Mr. President,

8. There have certainly been steps forward in the effort to expand the authority of the central government and the institutions of State in Afghanistan. The report of the Secretary-General made available to you outlines some of these steps, including recent efforts to increase the return of revenues to the central government and steps by President Karzai and his Minister of Interior to replace a few of the corrupt or incompetent officials. These initiatives show a mixed picture - of some success, but also limitations in the ability of the state to extend national policy throughout the country.

Security Sector Reform

9. Notwithstanding the Government’s efforts, much remains to be done to meet the basic demand of the population for tangible improvements in the security and rule of law. In recent months, armed attacks by extremist groups in the South and South East have increased. As the Secretary-General’s report highlights, this has had a negative effect on Government, UN and NGO development activities.

10. In these areas, the UN is closely monitoring the security situation at the district level on a weekly basis in order to identify ways and means to continue operations of support to the population while taking necessary precautions to ensure the safety of staff. Nonetheless, terrorist attacks against internationals and nationals remain a persistent threat. The tenuous and disruptive nature of the situation is exemplified by the increase in incidents over the last three weeks targeting police check posts, Afghans perceived to work with the government, and NGOs.

11. These events were highlighted when, on 29 July, an NGO convoy belonging to the Afghan Health and Development Services (AHDS) was stopped in Shahwalikot district of Kandahar by twenty armed men. The men, suspected to be Taliban, stole one vehicle and set another on fire. The group is believed to have earlier that day shot at two Afghans working with the Coalition forces, killing one. As a result of this incident, all UN road missions along the Kandahar-Uruzgan road were suspended on 30 July. Other incidents now make it impossible for us to work in all of the province of Zabul, almost all of Uruzgan, much of Kandahar and parts of Helmand. And, last night, a very serious incident occurred, in which a lot of people were killed in Helmand.

12. The limited ability of the government to meet such security threats results in stalled development activity that, in a vicious cycle, adversely affects the government’s and international community’s ability to provide services to the public and maintain confidence in the peace process. Unfortunately, this problem is not limited to the activity of those extremist groups politically motivated against the Bonn process.

13. Insecurity is problematic in many other parts of the Afghanistan as well. The North is a case in point. Clashes among local armed factions continue to flare up, most recently in Samangan province. The Security Commission that includes Jumbesh and Jamiat factions has written to the Defence Minister asking for his intervention to resolve ongoing tensions there, but in the Dari-Suf area of the same province, a ceasefire brokered by the Security Commission has remained fragile, with reports of renewed fighting coming all the time. Local flare-ups such as this deprive many districts from peace and the economic benefits of stability. So, too, to do the abuses by gunmen, who are regrettably often affiliated with those nominally holding local government authority.

14. The long-term solution to these problems lies largely in the reform of national security institutions. The importance of security sector reform was underscored at a national symposium on 30 and 31 July that brought together ministers and senior officials with the provincial Governors and Corps commanders from across the country. Government ministers and the five “lead nations” presented updates on the work being done in the army, police, justice, drugs and DDR sectors.

15. The symposium heard of some progress that has been made, including the training of six thousand soldiers of the new Afghan National Army, the establishment of a counter-narcotics directorate and the ongoing formation of the national drugs police, the completion of a national survey of the judicial system and the inauguration of the national headquarters for the Afghan New Beginnings Programme, responsible for carrying out the DDR effort.

16. The Minister of Defence made an important statement calling on those involved in the jihad to look forward, to build national unity and work together to achieve peace and stability. The Minister of Interior, for his part, announced that, with the support of the US and Germany, the police training programme would be broadened to eight locations to train some 25 – 30,000 police in the coming year. President Karzai expects the structure of the Ministry of Defence and the appointment of nationally representative staff to its senior echelon to be completed by the end of the month of August.

17. These indications, plus the reports that the United States will step up its contribution to building the police are particularly welcome. So too, are the continuing reports that deployments of new troops of the Afghan national army are being very well received by the public. Indeed, in July, the national army successfully weathered its first combat mission, seeking out suspected Taliban in Zurmat in Paktya province. These initiatives will help the DDR programme to be successful, to progressively “clear the table” of existing forces to make space for the new army and police. However, as the Secretary-General notes in his report, the start of the DDR programme is dependent on the implementation of reforms in the Ministry of Defence.

18. The Ministry of Defence insists naturally and rightly that they must take the lead in the DDR effort. They also know full well that Afghans will only hand over their weapons readily if they see that the MoD is a truly national institution. A good step forward was made with the appointment of a nationally representative group of senior officers to command the new National Army’s Central Corps.

19. We now await the announcement of similar reforms to make the Ministry’s structure and senior management more nationally representative, which would provide a meaningful signal to the rest of the country that their future lies not in local armies but in the national system of defence.

20. The beginning of DDR is now critical, because in many quarters Afghans are expressing scepticism about the credibility of constitutional and electoral processes that would take place without any significant reduction in the control exercised by local and factional commanders through the use of force and, thus, over the political space available in the country. There is a real concern that if the delegates to the Constitutional Loya Jirga a few months from now cannot take encouragement from even the beginning of disarmament - as a signal that the rule of the gun is ending - it will adversely affect the environment in which they deliberate on the constitution, which must of course be the basic framework for the rule of law in the country and the definition of the role of the State.

Constitutional process

Mr. President,

21. The Constitutional Commission has done its best to mitigate the lack of security so far in the Constitution making process. It has successfully completed public consultations but had to avoid more vulnerable district level meetings. They held public consultations in provincial capitals only, and through smaller, focussed groups that could more easily be protected from intimidation.
22. The Ministry of Interior provided dedicated police to protect the consultations. More than 350 meetings were held with more than 79,000 participants – 19% of whom were women. In addition, over 50,000 written submissions have been sent on to the Commission. The Commission is now hard at work analysing the results of these consultations and public comments. A synthesis of the findings will be ready anytime now and the Commission is working to incorporate views of the public gained from the consultation phase into provisions in the draft constitution.

23. As the draft is being finalised during August, the preparations for the selection of the delegates to the Loya Jirga are also underway. The 15,000 district delegates who selected the delegates to the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002,will again be gathered to select, by secret ballot, three hundred forty-four delegates to the Constitutional Loya Jirga on a provincial basis. These 344 delegates would be joined by 106 delegates chosen by selected constituencies, including women, IDPs and refugees, nomads, Sikhs, and Hindus, of which 15 percent will also be women. In addition, there will be 50 appointed delegates, half of whom will be women, at least.

24. While preparations will begin in earnest in late August and continue throughout September, the election process itself will occur immediately before the Loya Jirga, currently scheduled to begin in early October. This is so that the delegates can be brought from the provinces directly to the Loya Jirga site in Kabul, thus minimising the potential that they will be subjected to local influence or intimidation once it is known they have been selected. Once again, this is aimed at mitigating the effect of insecurity and factional influence on the process.

25. There has been some discussion in the Constitutional Commission of a possible delay of the Constitutional Loya Jirga, as a number of Commissioners would like more time to finalise the draft constitution and to prepare for the selection process. However, the Commission has decided to press ahead with the schedule and assess again the situation at the end of August, depending on how much of the critical drafting and preparatory work is actually achieved this month.

26. There is good reason to expect that the draft constitution prepared by the Commission will ultimately be a document that balances the demands and expectations of the Afghan public and reflects also modern constitution principles and Afghanistan’s international obligations. The Commission is trying hard to balance the various demands on it. Council Members will no doubt appreciate, however, that the constitution must first and foremost reflect Afghan values, aspirations, needs and priorities.

Elections

Mr. President,

27. Work toward the registration of voters for the national elections called for under the Bonn Agreement is now gathering significant momentum. There were some delays due to the need to allow the Government time to decide on the method by which it would collaborate with UNAMA. On 26 July, President Karzai passed two decrees providing the framework for this cooperation.

28. The first decree established an Interim Elections Commission comprised of six Afghans, two of whom are women, that will advise the Government on electoral issues. UNAMA will work with the Commission on the voter registration programme. The second decree establishes a Joint Electoral Management Body, that brings together the Afghan Electoral Commissioners with international electoral experts who will together oversee the conduct of the voter registration. The registration will begin in a rolling start: on October 15, 99 registration teams will deploy, followed by 99 more in early November and then the final complement of 77 teams by the end of November. Through the winter months, the teams will endeavour to reach eligible Afghans in the urban and accessible rural areas, and more remote locations will be served once the spring thaw allows access.

29. The Afghan electoral commissioners and UNAMA presented to donors in Kabul the operational plan for the registration, along with the summary of the budget of $75.6 million. Every effort has been made to limit the costs of this voluntary budget. Now, it is vital that funds be made available if the registration is to be implemented and completed by next April. I hope that the Council will appeal to donors to provide funds early so that equipment can be procured in time for the start of registration. Much of the material will of course remain with the Afghan government and it is hoped that the Interim Electoral Commission will form the nucleus of a lasting independent electoral capacity that will be built up to serve Afghanistan’s electorate for years to come.

30. The Afghans and UNAMA staff leading the electoral registration exercise will do their utmost to register the voter population in time for the elections scheduled for June 2004 under the Bonn Agreement. However, as I have previously mentioned to this Council, credible elections that help solidify the peace process and serve as a foundation for democratic government will depend upon more than our technical preparations. Much more must be done to create credible conditions for a fully representative government to be chosen next year by the people of Afghanistan through free and fair elections. Legislation on political parties and media access must be put in place that will define a more level political playing field. The electoral system must also be agreed upon and legislated for.

31. In addition, steps must be taken to ensure a secure environment for political activity. Police will be needed, but they must be impartial, lest they actually constrict the political space by serving factional or partisan interests. The Ministry of Interior has prepared a plan for special police to be trained to protect the registration sites and eventually the polling itself. Donor resources will be needed for this too. In order to achieve credible elections, we must work in an integrated manner to broaden the scope for fair political competition and improve the security environment in which it will take place. In consultation with partners in Kabul, we have drawn up a strategy that, if implemented, would at least to some degree, achieve this. I am circulating this paper to the Council today, with the hope that the international community, along with the Afghan authorities, will do its utmost to support the achievement of the benchmarks that would help ensure that the elections are credible and do advance the peace process.

Mr. President,

32. The political processes of the Bonn Agreement culminate in national elections, but one must ask what an elected government and parliament are worth if the levers of the State do not exist or cannot be controlled by the Government and Parliament. Again, the central challenge of Bonn is to help Afghans reconstitute the institutions that make up the State. At present, the factional control over local forces and politics makes this very difficult to achieve.

33. This, you will agree, Mr. President, is a particularly important argument for the provision of international security assistance beyond Kabul. As the Secretary-General notes in his report, this remains both necessary and the best way to fill the security gap in the regions. We are working with the PRTs to see how they can increase their focus on supporting the security sector and Bonn processes. In this respect, I am glad to announce that it has been agreed that the PRTs will be supporting the Constitutional Loya Jirga, national election, and DDR. This being said, I believe that to be effective, international assistance will need to be at a scale larger than currently available through PRTs. It would need to be at a level sufficient to help create the space for the political process of Bonn, to help the central government expand its authority, to speed up police and army deployment. I hope that, with the arrival of NATO to take over the leadership of ISAF, all concerned might, at the very least, sit down to consider what the options are to extend security, and thus the reach of the State, beyond the capital.

Mr. President,

34. I have focussed my remarks today on some of the needs to support the building of the State because I believe that without national state institutions, the sustainability of the peace process will be in question. There are of course many other areas that deserve attention. Most of them are covered in the Secretary-General’s report. However, there is one point which I believe must be of concern to the Council, and that is the recent difficulties that have arisen in the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. These difficulties may be exaggerated in the media. However, increased infiltration of Taliban and the heightened concerns among the public in Afghanistan regarding the situation on the border, combined with the inexcusable attack on the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul on 8 July, have recently compounded to create a downturn in what had otherwise been a very constructive period of increased bi-lateral contacts on trade and assistance. It is of the utmost importance that the mutually supportive bilateral relations between Afghanistan and all its neighbours are strengthened and built up on the basis of the 22 December Declaration they all signed.

Mr. President,

35. It is important that the tripartite Commission recently created by Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States be used to the full to address and solve the issue of cross-border infiltration. Normalisation of the situation on the border will go a long way towards restoring the needed confidence between the two neighbors and enhancing the prospects of peace consolidation in Afghanistan.

Mr. President,

36. Notwithstanding the security situation, significant progress in the implementation of Bonn has been made. Above all, this progress is testimony to the determination of the vast majority of Afghans to see a lasting peace. Having made some progress there is now more to protect. We are at a point where so much is at stake – both for those who wish for peace and those to whom peace represents a threat. If a stable Afghanistan is to be realized the progress made so far must be protected and built upon.

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