Security Sector

      
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2004

Afghanistan tenuous security situation has continued to threaten the gains of the transitional process, with incidents caused by terrorist and criminal activities as well as factional clashes. The increase of poppy cultivation and narcotics has continued to be of particular concern in 2004 as they further eroded the environment. This situation has had a negative impact on assistance and development programmes in the country, as deployment of UN personnel, NGOs and other humanitarian agencies was restricted due to security considerations.
A example of the tenuous security situation was the abduction of three UN electoral employees on 28 October 2004 in Kabul in broad daylight. They were released on 23 November. In September 2004, demonstrators attacked UNAMA, UNHCR and other UN and NGO offices in Herat. In 2004 some 33 voter registration personnel were wounded, and 12 were killed.
Without substantial progress in addressing the sources of insecurity, reconstruction efforts and the establishment of viable State institutions will continue to falter and the economy may well be subsumed by the illicit drug industry. Improving security throughout Afghanistan and establishing the rule of law are key elements for a successful transition to peace.

Although 2004 saw progress in the Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration process, the establishment of the new Afghan National Army and National Police as well as in the reform of the justice sector, support from the international community, in particular through the presence of international military forces, will continue to be required. The deployment of additional international forces, especially through Provincial Reconstruction Teams can provide the critical space in which progress can be made in the mutually reinforcing areas of security-sector reform, anti-narcotics activities, reconstruction, expansion of government authority and imposition of rule of law.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
The Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration process supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and under the leadership of Japan began in October 2003. It has two major components: the demobilization of soldiers from existing units and the cantonment of heavy weapons, to which an ammunition survey has been added in December 2004. Participants to the Berlin Conference in April 2004 resolved to demobilize at least 40 % of 100,000 targeted soldiers and to canton all heavy weapons prior to the elections.

While these targets were not met prior to the election, the electoral process itself appeared to have a positive effect on disarmament. For example, a provision in the electoral law stated that candidates could not register to vote if they maintained connections with armed militias. Hence, the Central government appointed commanders from within the structure of militias that were linked to aspiring candidates. The Ministry of Justice, in accordance with the political party law, also refused to register groups with known links to armed factions. This provided a further incentive to decommission militia units.

To accelerate demobilization and disarmament, in July 2004 the President issued a decree identifying additional units to be demobilized prior to the elections and instructing the Ministries of Defence and Finance to begin to apply financial sanctions in cases of non-compliance. By the end of September an additional 5,480 soldiers had entered the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, beyond the 15,355 that had been disarmed before the decree was issued. Over20,000 soldiers have begun the process of reintegration.

The issue of irregular militias also needs to be addressed. These are armed groups that are not on the payroll of the Ministry of Defence, and hence not included in the ongoing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. But these groups are increasingly responsible for insecurity in many parts of Afghanistan. The Government, together with the international community in Kabul, is examining the means to dismantle these groups through weapons collection and community development programmes.

Afghan National Army
The Afghan National Army, which is being formed under the lead of the United States of America, assisted by France, has grown to approximately 15,000 trained personnel, of which approximately 8,500 passed basic training during the review period. At full strength, it will consist of approximately 70,000 soldiers organized into five corps: the central corps in Kabul and four regional corps in Kandahar, Paktia, Herat and Balkh. The three brigades in the central corps are currently at full strength, with 15 battalions altogether. Plans are under way to develop the more technical elements of the corps, especially artillery, air defence and engineering. It is expected to take five to seven years to fully establish the regional corps. The process has begun, with four regional corps commanders and some of their key staff having been appointed on 1 September 2004. The Afghan National Army currently has 18 battalions deployed around the country on security and “show of force” tasks.

The main accomplishment of the Afghan National Army over the year 2004 was the provision of security for the presidential election. It was an integral part of the nationwide security plan and played a major role in the search for improvised explosive devices before polling stations opened, in securing roads and as a visible quick-reaction force. In addition, it was primarily responsible for the security of the regional counting stations. Throughout the election the soldiers were highly visible and technically proficient and were able to secure the cooperation of Afghans in locating and neutralizing improvised explosive devices, rocket-launching areas and potential ambush sites.

The Afghan National Army also provided security, in isolated cases, for the mobile disarmament units conducting the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. In addition, it was instrumental in separating the forces of Ismail Khan and his opponents, Amanullah Khan (Shindand) and Zahir Khan (Qalae-Naw), in western Afghanistan during the conflict in August 2004, when it deployed two battalions to the area at short notice, where they provided a buffer between the belligerent forces to allow negotiations to continue.

Afghan National Police Reform
Training, staffing and sustaining an effective police force is a vital element of assuring security and the rule of law in Afghanistan. This task, undertaken under the lead of Germany, has proved to be challenging. The existing police force continues to suffer from a lack of well-trained officers, appropriate equipment and effective command structures. A number of important initiatives were taken to address these concerns. Five regional training centres were established across the country, in addition to the German-supported Police Academy and the United States-led Central Training Centre in Kabul. As of mid-October 2004, 2,624 personnel had been trained at the Kabul Police Academy. These included 1,831 non-commissioned officers, of which 55 were female, and 752 border police. In addition, 27,200 police received basic police training through United States Government-supported programmes. The projected strength of the police force is 50,000, plus 12,000 border guards.

At the Doha conference on police reconstruction, held on 18 and 19 May 2004, co-hosted by the Governments of Afghanistan, Germany and Qatar and the United Nations, participants pledged $350 million for police programmes over the next few years. The UNDP-administered Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which pays for police salaries and equipment, currently suffers from a financing shortfall of $72.6 million.

The Afghan police force proved itself during the electoral process despite its limited means. Police, who were provided with specific electoral training, accompanied registration teams to ensure their security and provide order during registration. Police also guarded polling sites on election day and, along with the Afghan National Army, formed the first line of defence against those who might have attacked the election process.

Justice Reform
The process of reforming the justice sector, led by Italy, is based on two complementary efforts: strengthening political will and providing financial and technical assistance. The general assessment of the justice sector is that there is weak management and communication among justice institutions, and this needs to be addressed by coordination at all levels. The absence of implementing legislation for organizing the justice system compounds these problems. In addition, after 25 years of war, the justice sector lacks the required number of skilled staff, and there is a real need to build the capacities of existing justice-sector staff.

Under the new Constitution the Supreme Court is the highest judicial organ in Afghanistan, and its structure and administration are well defined. The physical facilities of the permanent justice institutions, including the Supreme Court, the Attorney General’s office and the Ministry of Justice, are currently undergoing rehabilitation with support from UNDP.

Legal education reform, also supported by UNDP, is a crucial step for ensuring a new generation of judicial staff. Two legal education systems exist in parallel: the Faculty of Law and Political Studies, following the French model, and the Faculty of the Shariah. Both have very old curricula that have not been revised over the past 25 years. Future actions include setting up a board of experts to work closely with the Ministry of Higher Education; the enhancement of teaching and research capacities; the creation of new linkages with foreign academic institutions the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure (justice facilities in six provinces, including Kabul, are being rehabilitated); and the establishment or improvement of law libraries.

Complementary to the justice reform effort is the rehabilitation of the correctional system, supported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. A key reform was the transfer of prison administration from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice. A draft penitentiary law finalized by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is currently under review by the Ministry of Justice. The Office has also begun the rehabilitation of the detention and prison facilities in Kabul and selected provinces so that they meet international standards.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has also been providing advisory services and legislative assistance for ratifying and implementing the 12 universal instruments against terrorism. Assistance has been provided in reviewing and drafting the relevant national legislation, and training activities are being undertaken to facilitate their practical implementation.

Counter-Narcotics Activities
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Opium Survey 2004 indicates that opium cultivation increased by two thirds in 2004, reaching an unprecedented 131,000 hectares and taking place in all provinces. Bad weather and disease, however, lowered the opium yield per hectare, resulting in an output of 4,200 tons — an increase of “only” 17 per cent. Afghanistan remains the world’s largest opium producer, accounting for 75 per cent of global production. In 2003, the domestic value of the crop in Afghanistan was about $2 billion to $3 billion (or an estimated 68 per cent of the gross domestic product), while its value on the world market was about $30 billion to $60 billion.

Due to excess supply, opium prices in 2004 are 67 per cent lower than they were last year. Stable heroin prices at border crossings are likely the result of law enforcement, which has made it more difficult for traffickers to refine drugs and smuggle them across the country.

Economic dependency on poppy cultivation, limited law enforcement resources, corruption and the lack of an effective institutional framework for drug control add to the complexity of the situation. Narcotics are becoming an increasing threat to national security, social stability and governmental effectiveness. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has taken the lead role in addressing this particularly difficult issue.

There are three key elements involved in eliminating the poppy economy and its deleterious effect on Afghanistan’s political and reconstruction processes. First, the international community must assist the Government of Afghanistan in its interdiction efforts. If vigorously pursued, these efforts will substantively decrease the drug trade in the coming few years. Participating in interdiction will strengthen the Afghan Government’s counter-narcotics institutions. At the same time, the Government must be assisted in strengthening its institutional capacity to arrest, investigate, try and imprison serious criminal offenders. Second, local economies must be supported through the provision of licit on-farm income-generating opportunities and the establishment of larger-scale infrastructure and industrial projects to provide non-farm income opportunities. Third, the link between the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration effort and counter-narcotics activities must be addressed. Ex-combatants resisting disarmament, demobilization and reintegration continue to have significant resources and power because of the illicit drug trade, which enables them to influence government institutions, thereby overriding the existing rule of law.

Dismantling the opium economy will require, therefore, a combination of coercive measures and the instruments of democracy, rule of law and development. National efforts alone will not suffice. Afghanistan’s cultivation and trafficking have ramifications for transit countries, just as habits in consumer countries provide incentives to maintain the opium economy, with all its deleterious effects, in Afghanistan. Therefore, additional efforts are also needed by countries through which Afghan opiates are trafficked and places where heroin abuse is a significant problem.

Other Security Elements

Provincial Reconstruction Teams
The Provincial Reconstruction Team Working Group is the operational forum where the Government, donors, military forces and other civilian and military actors can discuss the management of civil-military issues. The non-governmental organization (NGO) Civil Military Group allows for direct dialogue between national and international NGOs and the military forces. These two structures are linked and report to the Provincial Reconstruction Team Executive Steering Committee, a high-level decision-making and consultative body that provides guidance to the management of provincial reconstruction teams and on how civilian and military actors interact within the framework of development and reconstruction.

Both ISAF and the coalition forces have planned the integration of provincial reconstruction team operations with the national priority programmes led by the Government of Afghanistan. Although there is a gap between plans and implementation, there is a commitment to ensure that the reconstruction work of the provincial reconstruction teams is carried out in agreement with Afghan authorities. There are currently 19 provincial reconstruction teams (15 coalition-forces teams in the south, south-east and west and four ISAF teams in the north). ISAF is planning the second stage of its expansion, which will cover the west of the country.

Afghanistan Security Management Team
The UN Country Team has had to collectively manage the challenges posed by a highly dynamic and insecure environment— particularly in the south and southeast of the country. To better respond to the increased intensity of security incidents in the latter half of 2003, the Afghanistan Security Management Team (SMT) formed a small working group that engages in more in-depth discussion and strategic thinking regarding UN security management, as well as provides constant follow-up to the decisions of the SMT. Nonetheless, the deterioration of security has had a wide-ranging, and often negative, impact on the delivery of assistance, particularly of a humanitarian nature. UN Agencies have faced increasing difficulty in identifying implementing partners, including Afghan NGOs, which are able to safely operate in insecure areas. In the short-term, the burgeoning drug economy is likely to exacerbate insecurity by supporting local commanders and drug-lords in the regions. Poverty reduction and institutional strengthening of the law and order institutions of the state will be essential to countering the spread of illegal drugs. In the coming year, more creative mixtures of public and private investment will need to be used in a manner that generates opportunities for demobilized combatants to rejoin the civilian economy, and which assists Afghanistan’s farmers in finding viable alternatives to opium cultivation.

The tedious security environment was illustrated at the end of 2004, when, on October 28 - a few weeks after the holding of successful elections - three UN election staff workers were abducted in broad daylight in Kabul. They were relieased on 23 November the following month.