Political Affairs

      
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UNAMA plays a key role in promoting more coherent international engagement in Afghanistan; supporting regional cooperation in the context of the Afghanistan Compact; promoting humanitarian coordination; and contributing to human rights protection and promotion, including monitoring the situation of civilians in the armed conflict.

The political mandate of UNAMA supported the implementation of the institutional and political objectives of the Bonn Agreement, signed in November 2001, as well as a range of peace-building tasks and currently includes:
· Preventing and resolving conflicts;
· Building confidence and promoting national reconciliation;
· Monitoring and advising on the political and human rights situation;
· Investigating and making recommendations relating to human rights violations;
· Maintaining a dialogue with Afghan leaders; political parties; civil society groups; institutions; and representatives of central, regional and provincial authorities.
· Recommending corrective actions.

Background to UNAMA
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established by the Security Council through the 28 March 2002 Resolution 1401 (2002) for a period of one year, with subsequent renewals approved each following year. The mandate and structure of the mission, endorsed by the Council in resolution 1401, were specified in the Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security dated 18 March 2002.

The key aspects of the political mandate of UNAMA include support for the implementation of the institutional and political objectives of the Bonn Agreement, as well as a range of peace-building tasks:

· Preventing and resolving conflicts
· Building confidence and promoting national reconciliation
· Monitoring the political and human rights situation
· Investigating human rights violations

And, where necessary:

· Recommending corrective actions
· Maintaining a dialogue with Afghan leaders, political parties, civil society groups,   institutions, and representatives of the central authorities
· Undertaking good offices when necessary to further the peace process.

The implementation of the institutional and political objectives of the Bonn Agreement throughout the transitional period include the following institutional steps:

· Emergency Loya Jirga (see Fact Sheet on Loya Jirga) – 2002
· Constitutional Loya Jirga – 2004
· Presidential election – 2004
· Parliamentary elections – 2005 (http://www.jemb.org)

Bonn Agreement
In late November 2001, the United Nations organized a meeting Bonn, Germany, of representatives of Afghan political groups opposing the Taliban. When the meeting concluded on 5 December, those factions, in the presence of the Special Representative to the Secretary-General and other representatives of the UN and the international community, adopted the Bonn Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (See Bonn Agreement Fact Sheet).

One day later, the Security Council, in its resolution 1383 (2001), endorsed the Agreement and declared its willingness to take further action to support the interim institutions established therein, as well as the implementation of the Agreement. An annex to the Agreement also requested the deployment of a multinational security force to Kabul.

On 20 December, Security Council resolution 1386 (2001) authorized the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help the Authority maintain security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. The initial mandate of the force was for a period of six months. On 23 May 2002, the mandate was renewed for a further six months by Council resolution 1413 (2002). (In January 2004, ISAF expanded its reach beyond Kabul.)

On 21 December 2002, SRSG Brahimi moved with a small team to Kabul, where he was joined by a complement of persons from the existing UN Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMA) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), whose international staff had been based in Islamabad.

The Bonn Agreement specified the establishment of an Interim Authority on 22 December 2002 consisting of an Interim Administration with Hamid Karzai as the Chairman, a special Independent Commission for the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga, a Supreme Court of Afghanistan and other such courts established by the Administration. The agreement further specified the convening of a Constitutional Loya Jirga to adopt a new constitution for Afghanistan. The Transitional Administration was mandated, within two months of its commencement and with the assistance of the United Nations, to establish a Constitutional Commission to assist the Constitutional Loya Jirga in preparing the proposed Constitution.

The Emergency Loya Jirga
The Emergency Loya Jirga was to elect the President of the Afghanistan’s Transitional Administration (ATA). At the end of the Jirga, which took place between 12 and 19 June 2002, Hamid Karzai was elected as the President of the ATA.

The Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga, established on 25 January 2002, determined the modalities of the process, without which the Emergency Loya Jirga would not have taken place.

The process of selecting some 1,500 delegates from close to 400 districts of Afghanistan, which began on 16 April 2002 in the northwestern region and ended on 6 June 2002 in Kabul, demonstrated the extraordinary support for the Loya Jirga process throughout the country. For seven weeks, teams organized by the Special Independent Commission, accompanied by some 50 UNAMA staff and international monitors, criss-crossed the country, reaching out to the most remote settlements in order to increase awareness of the Commission's role, review conditions for holding shuras (meetings), and raising awareness through public information campaigns about the Loya Jirga process.

Very successful meetings were held throughout the country during the first phase. In most cases, local communities showed a very positive response, as thousands, and sometimes tens of thousands of people, gathered in district assemblies. In the second phase, district representatives, who met in regional centers, elected through secret ballot their candidates for the emergency Loya Jirga.

The Emergency Loya Jirga was held between 12 and 19 June 2002 in Kabul. UN personnel and international observers were on hand at the Loya Jirga tent – which accommodated some 2,000 people – involved in the monitoring of voting and counting to ensure fair conduct and the correct following of procedures. They also provided support to the Loya Jirga Secretariat on floor management, rules and procedures, voting mechanisms, and elections.

The Loya Jirga was not without difficulties, as had been expected. Some were of a logistical nature, as access to a number of districts was inhibited by geography or weather conditions. Other problems related to the state of insecurity that existed due to tensions or open conflicts between tribes and local commanders in some regions.

A broader problem resulted from the very success of the Loya Jirga process, as its obvious importance encouraged certain elements to use the event to seek political legitimacy. As a result, attempts by local commanders and authorities to control the outcome of the selection process by money or by intimidation were evident in different regions at various times. Incidents in approximately one dozen districts were deemed serious enough by the Special Independent Commission to warrant cancellation of some district elections.

There were a number of complaints of intimidation during and after the Loya Jirga. The SRSG consistently addressed those cases, particularly through his strong representations to Governors, commanders and the highest authorities of the Interim Administration. In such situations, he urged them to take firm steps to protect the integrity of the process.

The UN and the international community also gave critical logistical support to the Special Independent Commission and the Loya Jirga process. This included providing transport (including an important air operation), premises and communications facilities. Contractors were called upon to prepare eight election sites, while GTZ (German Technical Cooperation or the Agency for Development Cooperation) rehabilitated part of the Polytechnic institute in Kabul and installed several tents to house the Loya Jirga itself.

In collaboration with the Afghan Ministry of Women's Affairs (MOWA), UNAMA also held an induction course for women delegates to the Loya Jirga and provided advice and assistance to them throughout the assembly. The 200 women delegates selected for the Loya Jirga process were particularly active, and more than 20 of them were eventually elected. A dividend of that collaboration was the creation of a lasting national network of 45 Afghan women delegates. UNAMA has continued to lend all possible assistance to MOWA in promoting this process.

The overarching victory of the Emergency Loya Jirga was that for the first time in 23 years, the Afghan people cast a vote for their leader. It is also significant that, despite any threats of intimidation, most delegates found the courage to raise controversial issues and make bold proposals. Many of the discussions on the floor of the Loya Jirga demonstrated that national unity was slowly being forged around common concerns and that a process of reconciliation had begun. It was the first step forward in a process bound to take years.

The Constitutional Loya Jirga
The nine-member Constitutional Drafting Commission was formally inaugurated 3 November 2002. The Commission, which was chaired by Vice-President Ustad Niematullah Sharani, was made up of legal scholars and jurists and included two women. The 1964 constitution functioned as the starting point for the Commission’s draft constitution. The UN through its good offices supported the work of the Commission by assisting mainly with the establishment of its Secretariat, raising and coordinating support for the work of the Commission.

The Constitutional Loya Jirga was successfully concluded on 4 January 2004 with a nearly unanimous agreement among the 502 delegates on the final draft. In view of the many controversial issues that emerged and nearly paralysed the assembly in its final days, this agreement represented a significant achievement. Ultimately the various groups showed the political maturity needed to set aside the most divisive claims and reach a compromise on many of their remaining differences. The issues in question included the specific powers of the President, the nationality of ministers, the creation of a commission to oversee the implementation of the constitution, the timing of the elections, and the national anthem and language.

The compromise achieved between the proponents of presidential and parliamentary forms of government led to a system that is presidential in nature, but with a large degree of parliamentary oversight. For the first time in the constitutional history of Afghanistan, the definition of the nation explicitly included all minority groups. Languages other than Dari and Pashto were recognized as official in areas where they are spoken by a majority. The constitution enshrined equality of men and women and promoted women’s political participation by guaranteeing that at least 25 per cent of representatives in the lower house of parliament (Wolesi Jirga) will be women. The constitution provides a framework for the establishment of the rule of law consistent with the beliefs and prescriptions of Islam.

The positive outcome of the Constitutional Loya Jirga bolstered the political dynamics of the nation. The Security Council had been repeatedly informed of the concern that a continued sense of alienation in southern Afghanistan was a factor of instability. In contrast to the fragmentation observed in the past, however, delegates from the southern provinces demonstrated a sense of unity and purpose indicative of a renewed interest and optimism for national politics within that important constituency. This development in particular represented a welcome perception that the new constitution would offer a credible framework for power sharing.

The difficult task of implementation now lay ahead. The new constitutional framework would have meaning for the citizens of Afghanistan only if it translated into improvements in security, governance and welfare.

Presidential Election
The Bonn Agreement called for elections to be held in June 2004 — or two years after the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga — and also requested the United Nations to carry out a voter registration exercise. The latter occurred in two phases, the first between December 2003 and April 2004 and the second between May and August 2004. In the first phase, 1.9 million voters were registered in the eight main urban centres. The second phase, in which registration teams were extended to provincial capitals and rural areas, resulted in the registration of a further 8.6 million Afghans. Of the 10.5 million total registered voters, 41 per cent were women.

On 8 July 2004, the Chairman of the United Nations-Afghan Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) — the independent commission mandated to conduct and supervise Afghanistan’s electoral process — formally announced that the presidential election would be held on 9 October and parliamentary elections would be held in the Afghan month of Saur (20 April-20 May) 2005. While legal and technical difficulties provided a sufficient case for delaying and separating the elections, the JEMB also noted widespread concern in Afghanistan about the lack of disarmament and the fear that this could prejudice the conduct and outcome of the parliamentary elections. It therefore called upon the Government and the international community to continue and intensify, ahead of the presidential and parliamentary elections, efforts to strengthen the national armed forces and achieve broader disarmament, in order to create a safer and more open environment for candidates and voters.

The presidential election, which was contested by 18 candidates, including one woman, was held on schedule on 9 October 2004. Despite fears that the process might be targeted by anti-Government elements, no major security incidents occurred. A number of opposition candidates, however, raised serious allegations regarding the fairness of the process, including problems with the use of indelible ink to mark voters’ thumbs and assertions of undue influence on voters by polling staff and candidates’ representatives. Midway through the polling, those opposition candidates issued an appeal for voters to boycott the ballot. The boycott was largely ignored by voters: 8,128,940 ballots were cast, representing 70 per cent of registered voters. Forty per cent of voters were women. Polling also took place in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, where more than 580,000 and 240,000 Afghan refugees, respectively, voted. Some 5,321 domestic and 121 international observers and monitors, 22,000 party agents and 52,000 agents of candidates, as well as national and international media, followed the proceedings.

In the days after the ballot, most of the candidates who had called for a boycott continued to allege serious irregularities and demanded that some polling centres be reopened and that their complaints be investigated by an independent panel. While the JEMB disallowed any further polling, it did request UNAMA to nominate an independent panel of international electoral experts to investigate complaints.

The panel’s report to the JEMB, which was made public on 2 November, found that the irregularities observed did not have a material impact on the overall outcome of the election. President Karzai won the election with 55.4 per cent of the vote. He was followed by Yonous Qanooni, with 16.3 per cent; Haji Mohammad Mohaqeq, with 11.6 per cent; and Abdul Rashid Dostum, with 10 per cent. The remaining 14 candidates each received less than 2 per cent of the votes, and collectively 6 per cent. The candidates ultimately agreed to accept the election results.

A preliminary analysis of the final election results suggested that, as was the case with the Constitutional Loya Jirga, the assertion of ethnic identity played an important role. Electoral support for the four main contenders, President Karzai, Mr. Qanooni, Mr. Dostum and Mr. Mohaqeq, strongly correlated with the rural areas in which Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras are, respectively, the majority groups. Ethnic considerations, however, appeared to have had less impact in major cities. This may be attributable to the fact that, since ethnic identity was not exploited aggressively during the campaign, candidates were able to operate in capitals more widely outside their core constituencies.

President Karzai, whose inauguration took place on 7 December 2004, appointed a 27-member Cabinet on 23 December 2004. The composition of the Cabinet met the requirements of the Afghan constitution, and all ministers had higher education and hold only Afghan citizenship. It also reflected broadly the ethnic composition of the country, with ten Pashtuns, eight Tajiks, five Hazaras, two Uzbeks, one Turkmen and one Baloch. Three women are in the cabinet – among them the only female presidential candidate, Masuda Jalal.

Parliamentary Election
By early 2005, it became apparent that the parliamentary elections, originally scheduled for April-May, would require additional logistical and legal preparations. On 19 March, the JEMB announced that elections for Provincial Councils and Wolesi Jirga (Lower House of the National Assembly) would be held on 18 September.

Even while a fully finalized legal framwork for the ensuing electoral process remained outstanding, the JEMB established a timeline for key elements leading up to election day. Crucial among these were the periods for candidate nomination and additional voter registration.

On 29 April, President Karzai issued a decree approving the revised Electoral Law. On the following day, the Candidate Nomination period began as scheduled and concluded, following an extension necessitated by security incidents and other obstacles, on 26 May. The preliminary list showed a total of 6,102 candidates registered, 10 percent of whom were women. The list would then be reviewed for candidates’ compliance with all legal and constitutional stipulations.

To accommodate those not already registered, as well as those who would need to re-register, a supplemental period of Voter Registration was scheduled for 25 June to 21 July, with the exercise expected to draw between 1 and 2 million voters.

In addition, a Media Commission and an Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) were established well in advance of elections. The Media Commssion would monitor and oversee election coverage and candidates’ usage of media. The ECC would function as an independent body to adjudge offenses related to the electoral process, whether through complaints submitted by participants or pursued under its own authority.

The election of Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Councils effectively marks the end of the Bonn process and gives Afghanistan a fully representative national government. As enshrined in the Constitution, 25 per cent of the Wolesi Jirga shall consist of women representatives. Each of the 34 Provincial Councils elects one member to serve in the Meshrano Jirga, the Upper House of the National Assembly; these members are joined by 17 presidential appointees.

The full Meshrano Jirga as described in the Constitution, with seats numbering three times the number of provinces, requires additional representatives of the District Councils, as well as Presidential appointees equal to the number of provinces. District Council elections had to be postponed, however, pending resolution of disputes regarding district borders in some areas.